




MILITARY CENTER FOR STRATEGICS STUDIES



QUARTERLY

WINTER 2009



QUARTERLY

YEAR VII WINTER 2009



**Centro Militare
di Studi Strategici**

CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Major General Giacomo Guarnera

It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military strategy and other topics of significant interest.

The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Defence.

*Military Center for Strategic Studies
Department of International Relations
Palazzo Salviati
Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 –
ROME - ITALY
tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204
fax 00 39 06 6879779
e-mail relintern.cemiss@casd.difesa.it*

PERSIAN GULF

Iran's regime gets weaker, Saudi Arabia's influence in the region soars

Diego Baliani

5

SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

An overview of South Eastern Europe and main trends for 2010

Paolo Quercia

11

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES EASTERN EUROPE

Towards a new security architecture in Europe?

Andrea Grazioso

17

THE AFGHAN THEATER

Afghanistan-Pakistan 2010 proof of facts of the new american strategy

Fausto Biloslavo

23

AFRICA

2010: Africa, yes you "could"!

Maria Egizia Gattamorta

39

INDIA AND CHINA

The end of Chindia?

Nunziante Mastrolia

49

LATIN AMERICA

Economic recovery and political integration

Riccardo gefter wondrich

59

ENERGY SECTOR

Oil Rejected, renewable energy and energetic efficiency promoted

Gerardo Iovane

65

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The UN action in Somalia: between 2009 and 2010

valerio bosco

73

Negative balance for Russia in Central Asia

Lorena Di Placido

83

FOCUS ON

The importance of small and developing countries in solving crises in the International Community

Slobodan Simic

89

Persian Gulf



Iran's regime gets weaker, Saudi Arabia's influence in the region soars

Diego Baliani

In 2009, the balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the region's two leading rival powers, was such that Iran got weaker and Saudi influence increased.

Iran gained influence on a constant basis in the region between 2001 and 2006. But in 2006, it started to feel the pinch of international sanctions, of Israeli military actions against Hezbollah (2006) and Hamas (2008), and the internecine divisions among the ranks of the Iranian fundamentalist elite (2008). During the 2009 dialogue with the US, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election provoked widespread protests among the people seriously hurting the country's political stability. The regime was further weakened, and found itself having to take the path of authoritarianism.

Contrariwise, between 2001 and 2003 Saudi Arabia went through a difficult phase caused both by accusations levelled by US neocons of being in part responsible for the worldwide wave of Salafi'ite terrorism as well as by the threat Al-Qaeda posed to the ruling family. Following the victory over terror won between 2006 and 2009 at home, and having spent some 100 billion dollars in 2008 to stabilize the crude oil international market, in 2009 Saudi Arabia successfully financed the Lebanese electoral campaign (favouring the victory of the March 14 Alliance over the coalition of which pro-Iran movement Hezbollah made part), launched the dialogue with Syria (an Iran ally) and launched a military campaign against Shi'ite Yemeni "Huthi" (who might potentially fall in Iran's sphere of influence).

In view of the foregoing, one must not exclude that during 2010 the Iranian regime might decide to foment existent tensions in the region to turn attention away from its internal problems and keep repressing dissent.

Internal divisions and international pressure weakening Iran's regime

In *Prospettiva* 2007-2008 it was argued that Iran's political and military influence in the Middle East was soaring. This upward trend was sustained by (1) the relative political stability of its regime, (2) high revenues from State-owned oilfields, averaging 100 billion dollars a year between 2005 and 2008, (3) the US' elimination of its main adversaries, namely the Taliban regime in 2001 and Saddam Hussein's in 2003, (4) the launch of informal dialogue with the US, representing an acknowledgement of Iran's regional importance, and lastly (5) strategic collaboration with Syria and the region's strongest Islamist groups, namely Hezbollah, Hamas and Iraqi Shi'ite militias.

Persian Gulf

In *Prospettiva 2008-2009*, Iran's regional influence ascent was confirmed. But there were also signs of a possible slowdown. Such as (1) internal squabbles among Principalists (*Usulgaran*), between pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad factions, (2) the drop in petroleum prices to \$35 a barrel, slashing Iran's revenues and lastly (3) the possibility of an Israeli pre-emptive raid, though this was not deemed probable. In addition, it was foreseen with high confidence that (1) a Principalist candidate would be elected President in June 2009 and (2) an official dialogue with the US would be launched after a 30-year long absence of diplomatic relations.

During 2009, some of the trends forecast did take place. (1) Conservative "Principalist" candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected President for the second time on June 12, 2009. (2) Internecine divisions in the Principalist camp lingered on, even looming larger. (3) Lastly, the Obama Administration launched an official dialogue with Iran following President Barack Obama's March 20, 2009 video message. There were reversals in other trends. Petroleum prices, for instance, went up to \$75 a barrel. Lastly, certain forecasts did not materialize, the expected Israeli anticipatory raid on Iran's nuclear programme in particular.

The first evaluation concerns the political stability of the Iranian regime which past issues of *Prospettiva* had singled out as a contributory factor to Iran's soaring influence in the region. In 2009, political stability was badly hurt by the surfacing of a powerful movement of home-grown protests which seemed to have weakened the regime between June and November.

As was said above, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad won the June 12 elections and was re-elected President. Unlike the 2005 elections, this time round controversy raged about the possible rigging of the elections. Even if in 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had garnered no conspicuous support in Iran, on that occasion it could have been safely said that his victory was genuine. Reform-minded politicians looked discredited following Mohammed Khatami's 8-year stint as President (1997-2005) characterized by reforms promised but never delivered despite a parliamentary majority. Moreover, the image of the other running candidate (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, of the modernist Right, who had already served as Iran's president between 1989 and 1997) had been extensively damaged by corruption accusations levelled when he occupied former posts, and thus looked lacklustre to the Iranians. This time round, the victory is at the very least controversial. Opposition leaders keep blowing the whistle on Ahmadinejad's electoral victory deeming it fraudulent. They hold Mir-Hossein Mousavi the real winner and rouse their supporters to keep on with peaceful protests. As many as two million reform-minded voters have taken to the streets to voice their protest at Ahmadinejad's victory. They keep on protesting despite the regime's relentless efforts at suppression. According to media reports, between June and November 2009 the regime used both police and judiciary to quell the unrest. Some 3700 arrests were carried out; some 3600 were released from custody, whereas five cases were tried in public. Following five months of repression, opposition estimates of security forces killing added up to 72 protestors. Prison sentences were handed down against 81 opposition sympathizers and another five were given the death penalty. Alongside repression, it can also be concluded that the Principalist higher echelons reacted to the turmoil with even more uncompromising authoritarianism. According to members of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, between June and November seven Iranian security and intelligence services were reformed and placed under the Sepah-controlled intelligence organization. Between June and November, the regime repeatedly censored the opposition's media. Lastly, the Principalists elected to appoint a Shi'ite cleric in each school to oppose pro-

Persian Gulf

Western teachings. All in all, the Principalists have confirmed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory thanks to the repression of dissent. But they have ended up with a deeply divided country. The pro-reform camp does not seem intent on giving in to a further four years of conservative politics repressing social development. The deaths notwithstanding, peaceful protests have kept on, even though in the short term a revolution is nowhere in sight. Consequently, it is probable that the regime will manage to hold on to power, becoming ever more authoritarian and this will in turn foment further underground internal opposition and the system's instability.

A second potential threat to Iran's political stability stems from Sunni rebel group *Jundullah*. *Prospettiva 2007-2008* had argued that no internal security issue threatened Iran. That evaluation has to be rectified in part, following the October 18 suicide bomb attack which took the life of six high Sepah officials at Pishin (in the Sistan-Belucistan province). The attack has sparked off tensions between Iran and Pakistan. The former accused the latter of giving safe shelter to *Jundullah* militants on Pakistani territory following the attack. For the time being, it does not seem *Jundullah* poses a threat to Iran's political stability, but it cannot be excluded that its future actions may have more serious effects.

Lastly, there is a third element which does not really threaten the Iranian Republic's stability but could still hinder President Ahmadinejad's government, i.e. the internecine struggle inside the Principalist camp. Currently, the Principalist faction (the so called *Broad Principalist Coalition*) opposing the faction which supports the President (the so called *United Principalist Front*) at the moment includes Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, no least than 75 parliamentarians and part of the judiciary.

All in all, compared to 2008, the reformist opposition's show of force (which pushed the regime to carry out an inconvenient repression of dissent) and *Jundullah's* terrorist attack, induce us to conclude that during 2009 Iranian political system became more unstable, though not reaching critical levels yet.

From the economic viewpoint, certain parameters did better for the Iranian government in 2009. Petroleum prices went up and stabilized at around \$75 per barrel (signalling an upward trend in the State's oil revenues) whereas it would seem inflation went down from 29% in 2008 to around 16-17% in November 2009. Nevertheless, it would seem the US is promoting economic sanctions aimed at restricting Iranian imports of petrol (adding up to round about 22-23 million litres a year, equivalent to approximately one-third of Iran's national requirements) outside the UN Security Council to avoid Russia's and China's veto. There are clear signs that the Iranian government and economic system are gearing up for the sanctions. For instance, The Iranian Parliament has just approved a plan for public subsidy cuts which, at the time of writing, is being analyzed by the Council of Guardians. The plan is to bring the currently subsidy-controlled prices to market values. Given that subsidies concern about a third of Iran's economy, the reform, reckoned by many parliamentarians as necessary particularly in view of the upcoming international sanctions, might considerably increase the unpopularity of the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His support among the conservative electorate might shrink as a consequence. Even on the economy front therefore, there are signs President Ahmadinejad's government might weary out during 2010.

On the international front, in *Prospettiva 2007-2008* and in the 2008-2009 edition we had argued that the launch of the official US-Iran dialogue would have been equivalent to US acknowledgement of Iran's regional power status and would have strengthened Iran's position

Persian Gulf

of power in the region. This evaluation probably has to be amended as it did not take into account two variables. (1) The effects of the Iranian presidential elections. (2) The reform-minded electorate's strength. The evaluation's point of departure was the assumption that the reform camp had been discredited and enfeebled because of the Khatami presidency. This might have been true for reformist *politicians*. It is quite evident now that reformist *grassroots* did not forsake the will and strength to struggle on, even taking to the streets. It is therefore possible that two factors – desperation at the idea of four more years of social oppression under Ahmadinejad's presidency and the awareness that this oppression will be buttressed and legitimated in the eyes of the world by the dialogue with the Obama Administration – might have pushed reformist voters to take to the streets in a desperate attempt to avoid the confirmation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term of office. Seen as one with these elements, the launch of the US-Iran dialogue has not spelled a fresh lease of life on the regime, it has all but caused its implosion bringing its internal contradictions to the fore. This evaluation is coherent with another analysis we argued in the past. During his first term of office (2005-2009), President Ahmadinejad together with Supreme Leader Khamenei (or the Principalist higher echelons in general) were purposefully looking to confront the US and Israel to "isolate" the country and take the path of authoritarianism. This was spurred by the conviction that during the Khatami presidency the reformist élite had opened up too much to the West, exposing to risk the fundamental principles and stability of the Islamic Republic. The Bush Jr. Administration's aggressive policy, which threatened to topple the regime in Iran, played into the hands of the Principalists who could scare the population with a foreign enemy conspiring to overthrow the Iranian regime. They could thus revive Iranian nationalism and the fear of foreign interference in national politics. The Obama Administration policy, on the contrary, has turned the "Great Satan" into a potential partner, forcing the Iranian regime to proceed along the path of authoritarianism without having the comfort of distracting the people with the American enemy. Given the foregoing, we had argued that the regime would have been taken up finding solutions to internal problems and would not have had the will to reach a compromise with the P5+1 Group (US, France, UK, Russia, China + Germany). Such a compromise would have been perceived at home as a sign of weakness. However, having launched talks with the P5+1 on October 1, the Iranian regime then resorted to delaying tactics which have so far hindered agreement and heightened the probability of new international sanctions. Having said that, this evaluation too has to be examined again. It is not clear whether the current stalemate in talks is due to the President's Principalist faction or the faction hostile to him (the Broad Principalist Coalition). In October and November, after President Ahmadinejad signalled a certain degree of willingness to accept the agreement put forward by the P5+1 (which contemplated the transfer abroad of 70% of Iranian low-enriched uranium), Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani (a Principalist seen as hostile to Ahmadinejad) took on criticizing the P5+1 proposed agreement, and many parliamentarians followed suit. It is not clear, for instance, if the actions of the Principalists hostile to the President have genuine motivations or merely aim at weakening Ahmadinejad's government.

In conclusion, for 2010 the following is foreseen with moderate degree of confidence. (1) The Fundamentalist élite in power will push in the direction of the authoritarianism the country has started heading toward. It will invigorate security structures and cause opposition to the regime both on the streets and underground. Since the opposition does not seem to be able to topple the

Persian Gulf

regime at the moment, the result will probably be that the Iranian political system will go through more instability. (2) It is probable that both the actions of the reform-minded opposition and the rivalry within the Principalist front in power will serve as obstacles to nuclear talks between the regime and the P5+1 Group.

Saudi Arabia's Middle East influence soars

Whereas it seems that during 2009, Iran's position in the region weakened, Saudi Arabia's got stronger. This evaluation stems from comparing how it is now and it was between 2001 and 2003. Following the New York attacks of September 11, 2001, the US launched a War on Terror which wiped out the Taliban regime in 2001 and the Iraqi one in 2003. Nevertheless, certain US neocon thinkers had held Saudi Arabia in part liable for the attacks, given that 15 out of the 19 terrorists of 9/11 were Saudi citizens and that Saudi Arabia had for years financed Salafi institutions in many countries. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden used to criticize the Saudi ruling dynasty on account of US military presence on the territory where Medina and Mecca, the two holiest places for Islam, are situated (in other words, Saudi Arabia). This criticism exhibited both a touch of resentment as well as a threat. The resentment was engendered by the Saudi regime's preference in the 1990s for US military protection from the Iraqi threat to that offered by Osama bin Laden and his *mujahedeen*. The threat because the criticism hinted at future attacks in the Saudi kingdom. Between 2003 and 2006, Saudi Arabia seemed to have quelled the Al-Qaeda threat on its territory. Some of the subversive Islamist militants went to fight US troops in Iraq (often times dying there), while the others seem to have been neutralized by the anti-terrorist campaign waged by Saudi security forces. During 2008, almost to counteract the image of terror financier attributed it in the past by US neocons, Saudi Arabia spent some 100 billion dollars to augment its oil spare capacity of 2.5 million barrels a day (mbd) to 4.5 mbd, resulting in a daily production capacity of 12.5 mbd. It thus ensured petroleum prices stabilization at around \$75 a barrel. Citing the expenses incurred as example, Prince Saud al-Faisal asserted on *Foreign Policy* the responsible and stabilizing role played by Saudi Arabia on the world stage. In 2009, Saudi Arabia launched an important phase of detente and dialogue with the Syrian regime. In November, it officially launched its first military campaign against Yemeni Shi'ite rebels "Huthi", helping the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (whereas during the 1990s it had put its security in the hands of US Armed Forces). If the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is taken into account, then Saudi financing of the March 14 Alliance during the June 7 elections (which helped this alliance to beat its rival of which Hezbollah, a Lebanese pro-Iran Shi'ite movement, formed part), the launch of the dialogue with Syria (an Iran ally) and the military operation against the Shi'ite rebels in Yemen (which might fall within Iran's sphere of influence), will all highlight the Saudi kingdom's vibrant diplomatic, economic and military activities aimed at increasing its regional influence and antagonization of Iranian influence.

South Eastern Europe



An overview of South Eastern Europe and main trends for 2010

Paolo Quercia

Though there were no signs of relevant or alarming political or security deterioration, 2009 has not been a particularly positive year for south-eastern Europe. Above all, being the year in which the effects of the financial crisis unfolded, it has uncovered the fragile bases of the economic growth of the region's countries. For the past years, growth had been sustained by bank credits and international public expenditure. Greece and Serbia have been especially hit by the crisis, although it must be said, no country in the region has been immune to it.

South-eastern Europe's financial and economic crisis might have particular consequences in the coming years affecting also political integration and security, given that during the past years much of the region's stability has been based on the assumption that the region would enjoy a constant upward trend in its economic development. It was thought that opening the region's economies to the European and world free market system, industrial delocalization of enterprises and manufacturing districts in Western Europe, and significant infrastructural investments linked to trans-European transport corridors would have ensured the necessary economic flywheel enabling the closing of political gaps and the assuaging of ethnic and national tensions which still linger on in the region. Or, to put it differently, to finance the definitive way out of post-communism. In the wake of the economic and financial crisis, there is now the risk that this process grinds to a halt for an undetermined time.

Moreover, the region's economies are not only directly hit by the international crisis, but also indirectly. During the past two decades, the area has gradually and markedly integrated socio-economically with Europe. As soon as European countries have to make drastic choices in the industrial, employment and financial fields, they end up having no other option but to reduce their role in the region's countries, economically, financially, industrially and also trade wise. There is a direct correlation between the extent of this reduction and the level of existing economic integration. During 2009, for instance, all those region's countries which were most highly integrated with Europe, namely Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, and Turkey, have witnessed remarkable drops in their GDP. The hardest-hit was Romania, whose GDP plummeted approximately 8.5% when compared to the previous year. Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey (-6.5% each) come a close second, followed by Croatia (-5%). Among western Balkan countries, Serbia's economy went through the worst downswing, its GDP dropping by 4%. Recovery for many of the area's countries is expected to start as early as 2010. Yet, it cannot be

South Eastern Europe

stressed enough that the drop in GDP has been dramatic, considering that in 2008 many of these economies were experiencing 5-6% growth rates.

Countries with high emigration flows have been also affected by a marked reduction in remittances by émigrés to Europe which make up a strong component of national GDP in other economies. In Kosovo's case, the problem is compounded by coerced repatriations. During the year of independence and taking up of state responsibilities by Kosovo, coerced repatriations have grown to such numbers as to make the EU wary about the challenges posed to its rule of law missions in terms of social and public order responsibilities.

2009 has also confirmed progressive evolution trends with regard to external actors which determine the region's political developments. The tangible diminution in US strategic interest has been confirmed, though the EU is gradually filling the ensuing void. However, though not lacking in political commitment, the EU faces a serious problem stemming from the inefficaciousness of its political, economic and military presence. Despite its strong political and economic commitment, its ability to influence local political actors is weak, be they official or subsystemic (leaders, political elites, political parties, pressure groups, etc). NATO too has embarked on a reduction – justified from a strictly military viewpoint – in the number of troops stationed in Kosovo. Though not worrisome in terms of the evolution of the region's security situation, this reduction is politically important. It is viewed as indicating that the Serbian threat has waived and by and large the danger no longer looms from without. The NATO deployment trim now becomes strategically meaningful as it conveys the idea of the presumption of non-aggression from Serbia, particularly since the troops which have stayed behind are increasingly engaged in the protection of specific sites or enclaves, thereby forestalling possible ethnic conflicts or intervening to suppress them. This notwithstanding, moderate worries relating to this reduction in forces do persist since in the past Kosovo has shown a high degree of unforeseeability where ethnic clashes are concerned. They burst out virtually unprovoked, following months of uninterrupted hostile though not aggressive "neighbourliness". Such was the case of the incidents which took place all over the country in 2004. But NATO's lessened military presence is not to be perceived only from an ethnic standpoint but also in the light of the protection residual international forces afford to UN, EU and NGO personnel. NATO's trimmed deployment brings in its wake a weaker control of the territory and an enfeebled capability to intervene. Thus, the EU rule of law mission's ambition to maintain an intrusive presence has been curtailed. For these reasons, NATO's trimmed deployment in Kosovo should be accompanied by stepping up intelligence activities with a view to forestall possible negative developments and evaluate the possibility of providing prompt backup should the situation worsen.

The downsized presence of the actors abovementioned is paralleled by Russia's heightened regional presence. During 2009, Russia has paid more attention to internal political dynamics, having for the preceding years launched an important economic and energy penetration strategy. The war in Georgia, waged in the summer of 2008, has somehow concretely signalled that Moscow's political reappearance in the region has not met any effective American opposition. In fact, NATO's enlargement has somehow been stalled in Georgia and Macedonia. Russia's economic presence, concentrated on certain strategic sectors and linked to energy projects, represents one of the elements of the region's new dynamism. Russia's economic intervention is on two planes. The one is purely business-related. Russian businessmen invest in high-yield

South Eastern Europe

sectors, mostly real estate and tourism. The other is related to energy: both transport and retailing. In this field too there is a level of mostly strategic interventions (such as the South Stream Balkan branch project) and a level of speculative/entrepreneurial investments, epitomized by the purchase of distributors of energy products and lubricants. Russia's increasingly higher profile in the Balkan energy sector has worried American interests consternated by the possibility that energy dependence might turn into forms of political and strategic influence which in turn could be used to sabotage American plans to stabilize the region and to hinder plans for NATO enlargement in the region. Seen from this angle, it is plausible that Russian plans for economic and energy penetration in countries which belong neither to the EU nor to NATO (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in particular) do not aim at influencing a policy of NATO non-membership, but at laying down the bases for the future influence of these countries who will, possibly ineluctably, become members of the Atlantic Alliance.

That these future NATO member countries are liable to energy control is probably one of the reasons underlying Russian presence in the region's energy sector. However, in addition to this aspect of energy foreign policy, one must not underestimate real interests, of an economic nature. Apart from all politico-strategic considerations, these interests represent a vehicle for Russian external power projection in the Balkan peninsula viewed as a transit zone toward countries with high consumption levels of raw materials from eastern Europe.

Increased Russian influence in south-eastern Europe contributes to a phenomenon of geographical "enlargement" toward the region's east, thereby causing shifts of importance toward the Black Sea system and its connections with the Balkan peninsula. It is clear, in fact, that Moscow understands Russia's Balkan presence as a further extension of its influence on its near neighbourhood such as the Caucasus and Moldova. Metaphorically speaking, future considerable strengthening of this Russian "vector" in the region's geopolitics might cause the Balkan region to prefer the Black Sea system to the Adriatic or Central European ones.

There has been another geopolitical phenomenon in 2009: Turkey, which is more of a big regional power than a veritable external actor in south-eastern Europe. During 2009, Turkey has underlined its geopolitical "movement" toward the Middle East and in part toward Russia, thereby slowing down bilateral relations with the US and scaling down hopes of a fast integration with the EU. Ankara's downsized European dimension could give rise to a weakened Turkish projection toward the Balkans which could have been sustained as a spin-off of the integration process with Europe. French Foreign Minister Kouchner recently stated that the EU considers western Balkan integration more of a priority than Turkish integration. This statement has further signalled the potential hiatus which might beset south-eastern Europe in the near future, setting in motion the loss of some of its already precarious unitary condition. If this were to happen it would be mostly due to a series of factors such as the EU's dwindling attractiveness (caused by the paltry integration capabilities new members have demonstrated so far), increased Russian strategic presence (which could evolve into a new regional power), the downsizing of American strategic interests in the region, and the ongoing Turkish tendency to pursue largely neo-Ottoman-like policies aimed at Islam-embracing regions.

But there is hope for the region, as vouched by the removal of EU visa requirements of some western Balkan states, namely Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. This was a small step forward on the path to integration with the EU. It will also lead to the possibility of more

South Eastern Europe

demographic mobility for the inhabitants of these countries and should help to mitigate their current difficult economic situation. These measures further enable these countries' governments to facilitate the emigration of social groups which, for economic, ethnic, or political reasons, are somehow at the margins of their respective societies, thus making up social or ethnic quagmires, particularly when resources are scarce and cultural attitudes hardly suited to manage social diversity. This applies to the Albanian-speaking minority of Macedonia as much as to the Islamic community of Sanjak, northern pro-Serb Montenegrins, as well as Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, who are still saddled with serious integration problems in Serbia.

Kosovo's Serbs are another problem. Should they be able to obtain Serbian passports giving them easier access to the European job market (official, undeclared or criminal), there would be potentially high mass emigration. In view of this, the Commission has tended to disallow the inclusion of Kosovo Serbs holding Serbian biometric passports in the visa-free EU entry list. But the application of this dual system will probably remain on paper and it will be difficult to ascertain whether and how Belgrade will keep separate records of Kosovo Serb citizens to be excluded from the "white Schengen" system. (Clearly, this delicate issue is embrangled by the shadow of Kosovo's status question since Belgrade and five EU member States deny Pristina's independence and keep on formally recognizing uninterrupted Serb sovereignty on the whole of Kosovo.) Thus, unless Belgrade manages to maintain prolonged economic efforts to uphold minimum sustenance levels in the enclaves (which is improbable) or implements a strict policy *vis-à-vis* the issuance of Serbian passports to Kosovo Serbs (politically difficult), it is foreseeable that Kosovo's Serbian minority will risk growing thin fast, accounted for by better opportunities to emigrate toward the EU. Even before the emergence of legal channels, Kosovo Serbs will find *de facto* means of emigrating. Needless to say, the removal of visa requirements will temporarily permit only limited stays within the Schengen zones, but it is well known that most of illegal immigration in the EU takes place via the breaking of the rules on temporary stays upon the immigrant's legal entry into the Union.

In the meantime, Kosovo Albanians will not manage to benefit from these emigration opportunities, particularly following Kosovo's independence. As Kosovo passport-holders they are not exempt from visa requirements, and it is highly improbable that their requests for Serbian biometric passports be admitted and much less granted, even though the procedure is formally possible. It is still unclear whether Belgrade will try to hinder a possible exodus of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo or whether it will just fence-sit. In synthesis, the removal of the Schengen visa requirement for citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia might have far-reaching consequences for the ethnic homogeneity of a vast part of the Balkan region. The exodus of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities living on the margins of society and in economic straits will become a greater *de facto* possibility.

Lastly, it is worth noting the complex and important issue of the expected pronouncement of the International Court of Justice on the legitimacy of Kosovo's independence. The pronouncement is expected during 2010. The matter is very delicate on account of its political significance, its consequences on the evolution of international law, and the applicability of its conclusions to other geopolitical areas around the globe. It is foreseeable that the conciliation of so many highly varied interests will motivate the judges at The Hague to deliver a mixed judgment, which falling short of openly condemning Kosovo's independence as illegal, will try to reduce

South Eastern Europe

its effects and its applicability to other circumstances. It remains to be seen whether this balancing act will produce new juridical obstacles to the as yet partial status of international law subject which Kosovo has managed to forge in these two years since independence.

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe



Towards a new security architecture in Europe?

Andrea Grazioso

The events that marked the 2009 can be considered very significant in strategic terms and able to deploy their effects in the years to come. The most important factor was probably the sharp economic slowdown - actually a deep recession - which, as well known, began in the second half of 2008 and that strongly characterized the whole year.

Only at the end of 2009 there was evidence of clear signs of recovery in different regions of the world. As for the area under consideration, the economic crisis has proven to be extremely deep, almost overwhelming for those countries with a young market economy and able to deeply affect the so-called "real economy".

All countries in the region have scored dramatic falls in the Gross Domestic Product, huge deficits of budgets and a sharp increase in unemployment. This crisis, although common to all world economies, had a particularly heavy impact in those countries where a relatively recent adoption of a socio-economic model of capitalism and free markets had generally precluded the adoption of forms of economic and social protection, able to absorb the effects of abrupt and sharp economic contraction.

As a direct result, the level of stress on the political elites is further increased; if just before the crisis the political systems were under severe pressure for the rapid acceleration of the needs and expectations of public opinion, with the recession and the immediate deterioration of living standards of the population, the gap between expectations and actual results has expanded.

This was the case in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in ex-Soviet republics, beginning with Russia. In political terms, the effects of the crisis have resulted in some cases in a further weakening of political leadership, as the capacity and credibility of the politicians in managing the socio-economic phenomena, in other cases a further hardening of the leadership itself, meaning in this case the increase of the vertical control of the executives.

It is, in both cases, a trend that make it more complex multilateral governance, and therefore any hypothesis of political and economic integration at continental level.

Basically, Europe resulted as more divided between the rich and integrated West (European Union, NATO, etc..) and a poor and pro-Russian East.

The most significant effect of the crisis and, probably, the one that will last longer, is represented by the loss of a prevailing drive toward adoption of a common social and economic

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe

model, the "common European house", both in terms of fundamental values and in terms of material constitution and economic policies.

The sovereign democracy

The term "sovereign democracy", as known, was adopted by the Russian leadership to mean, at the same time, the existence of several political models worthy of being called "democratic", although characterized by significant differences between them, under the peculiar culture of each country, and the right of each "sovereign" country to adopt the "right" model of government.

In the few years after the public affirmation of this principle, the Kremlin certainly did not hesitate to see how this concept of "sovereignty" and "independence" by Western political and cultural patterns might determine significant differences also in their international relations.

Russia is increasingly free from any form of multilateral approach towards the management of international order, leading progressively to zero the "productivity" of the regional organisation of consultation and cooperation, and restoring a typically Soviet modus operandi of exploitation of its prerogatives in the United Nations.

The most striking event of course dates back to 2008, with the invasion of Georgia and the subsequent recognition - supported by a strong presence of their troops in the field - of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Before that, the "suspension" of compliance with the CFE Treaty had inflicted a terrible blow to the architecture of European security.

In 2009, the trajectory of Russia has further distanced the country from a path of convergence towards a political model similar, if not identical to that of most advanced countries. It further increased political control of the economy and society, and have further reduced the space available to domestic political opposition and freedom of the media, as well as the freedom of action for human rights activists and politicians.

While there are not appreciable differences between the period of presidency of Putin and Medvedev, many "Kremlinologists" continue to scramble to seek evidence of an alleged conflict between the two, and certainly can not be excluded that the time has gained a rivalry between current President and current Premier.

There seems, however, that such rivalry cannot lead to a significant change of direction for Russia, especially because the entire political and bureaucratic apparatus has progressively internalized the performance requirements and the mode of action typical of an authoritarian state.

From this point of view, the possible - but unlikely - event able to ignite some clash between the leaders, or between the different groups of power, would cause a "crisis in the regime", not a "crisis of the regime".

Only a systemic collapse of the economy, not adequately countered by appropriate management measures of law and order, could pose serious danger to the current system of power; therefore, it is no coincidence that Putin immediately further taut the Kremlin's control over any manifestation of dissent, as soon as the economic crisis emerged as serious as the present one.

Outwards, and then in the field of international policy, the Kremlin's action was perfectly consistent with the assumptions stated above, that is the emergence of a near-total independence

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe

from any form of coercion. However, it is useful to clarify it, there aren't the conditions for a new "cold war", even on a small scale.

Rather, and this could look a very important clue to even understand the possible future scenarios, Russia seems intent on securing a great freedom to manoeuvre in the international arena especially not to expose their political model to a direct confrontation – or any kind of “competition” - with that of other major countries.

Aware of the extreme systemic weakness of Russia, severely “ill” in the social body (demography, ethnic and cultural homogeneity) and severely impoverished in terms of capacity and technology, the Russian rulers have chosen an isolation far from splendid, but capable - at least in theory - to preserve the spirit, if not the values, of the Holy Mother Russia.

But 2009 has brought with it the gradual emergence of the trend towards forms of “sovereign democracy” in other post-Soviet reality, starting with Ukraine. The revolutionary *élan* of civil society seems to have greatly weakened, and it could not be otherwise, when you consider how many years – and how many cold winters – passed since the “orange days”.

Yushchenko's popularity seems to have been reduced to minimum levels and, more importantly, politicians and pro-Western liberals have adopted the “recipes” much less explicitly designed for integration in a world which, moreover, has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine "not ready" to join the club.

That's not to say that Kiev will go back to Moscow; whatever the outcome of the presidential election in January, Ukraine will adopt new “multi-vector” policy, that is essentially a swing between East and West, according to the marginal benefit that each swing can offer.

In many ways similar is the silent evolution in Central Asia. The penetration of China and the affirmation of the interests of Beijing are increasingly pronounced, in direct expense of both Russia and the countries of Europe.

Energy resources, in particular, represent a fundamental goal for China, those same resources Moscow had always control in order to exercise hegemony over Central Asian country, and to collect a substantial economic gain, thanks to their re-export toward the West.

While Europeans argue among themselves about which are most suitable routes to reach Europe for the Central Asian gas, to fuel an economic system that is widely integrated and interdependent, Turkmenistan began exporting its gas to China, and expects to multiply by six in just four years the volume of such exports.

In the medium term, the economic viability and technical feasibility of the project Nabucco, South Stream and, in many ways, the North Stream, will be severely challenged, simply because there will not be enough gas in Central Asia to support these increasing volumes of exports to the West, given the growth of gas imports from China. It is easy to predict, then, that not only the prospects for close economic cooperation, but also those of a progressive political convergence of these countries in Central Asia toward the Western model, are destined to never materialize.

Even those republics are destined to be more "sovereign" - because progressively less subject to the control of Russia, and less "democratic", because they will be less influenced by Europe and rather more penetrated by China.

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe

The military dimension

With the expiry of the START 1 and perhaps, more importantly, the inspection regime connected thereto, Russia and the United States has begun a serious and sincere exercise aimed at defining a new Treaty that can limit the burden of maintaining a strategic arsenals many times greater than those potentially capable of destroying any enemy - and any future.

The desire to reach a new agreement exists, because both the governments have urgent priorities of domestic order and serious economic problems. However, military capabilities and technology in the United States and Russia are no longer directly comparable, as appears to be abysmal the gap in military spending, which makes it objectively difficult to reach a compromise that is perceived as not penalizing both.

Russia is facing a dramatic decline of its strategic capabilities, with the block obsolescence of many systems. The component represented by ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles is in better condition for the substantial success of the construction program of "Topol-M" ICBM. To these missiles, Moscow intends to complement similar systems, but with multiple warheads, in order to maintain a high number of active nuclear devices, despite the existence of an annual production capacity of new vectors absolutely unable to replace with a ratio of 1 -to-1 those systems currently in service, and in large part already beyond their projected lifespan.

The component represented by submarine-launched missiles and their means of delivery could be significantly compromised by the failure of the new missile "Bulava", that during the test still does not achieve the promised results. New submarines are under construction, and the first of the class "Borei" is undergoing the sea trials, but the delay of the "Bulava" does not make possible the modernization of an arsenal that relies on much older systems, such as submarines "Delta IV" and the "Sineva" vectors.

If Russia will not be in charge of the problem is likely to see drastically reduced its component of strategic nuclear systems within ten years.

As for the air component, design of new bombers does not exist, nor can we seriously envisage launching new development programs in this class of weapons. Indeed, the pace of renewal of military equipment is extremely low, even and especially in the conventional component.

The only truly advanced aircraft design and truly "post-Soviet", that is the new tactical aircraft "PAK-FA" of Sukhoi, is still shrouded in mystery. He had to make the first flight in 2007 and this event was postponed from year to year, and again the aircraft has never appeared. Whatever may be his fate, Russia can never put into service a sufficient number of new aircraft - but the same is true for almost all other types of platforms - in order to replace systems inherited from the Soviet Union, which have now two decades or more on their shoulders.

The Navy, in particular, appears to be the "big sick" of Russian military, despite repeated cruises around the world performed by some prestigious vessels. The yards are almost empty, with very few units built in the last twenty years, so over a decade, the Russian navy is likely to be reduced to a coastal force, or perhaps a floating museum.

Emblematic in this regard, the request to France to acquire a large amphibious units, and the building plans for others to reproduce in Russia. Significant not only for the serious lack of capacity in design and implementation, but also the willingness of Moscow to use any means to disrupt and possibly unravel the alliance linking the countries of the West.

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe

The “outline” for a new European security Treaty

At this point, the most significant initiative, certainly designed to produce effects in 2010 and possibly in the years to follow, is the presentation by Moscow of a new draft Treaty, intended to completely reconfigure the security architecture in Europe.

The methods chosen by Moscow for this presentation are indicative of the great tactical ability of the Russians, who have wisely chosen the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for consideration of their proposal, immediately before the NATO countries began to forge a series of consultations designed to produce, over several months, key decisions for the future of the Alliance.

Almost defiantly, Russia has thus excluded from the privilege of knowledge all countries “in the middle” that is those countries part of Europe and members of OSCE, but not of NATO, clearly indicating that there is no future in the eyes of Moscow for an organization of collective security like the OSCE.

It could not be otherwise, when one considers the historical roots of this organization and its goal of promoting the values of democracy and political pluralism, issues born in Helsinki in 1975, but also incompatible with the “sovereign democracy” born in Munich of Bavaria in 2007.

Russia is by no means to communicate with “NATO”, according to a mechanism at “28 +1”; will instead discuss a scheme “at 29”, preventing - and not only procedurally - any convergence of the countries of the Alliance on a common negotiating position.

Moreover, more in details, Moscow conceive the dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council as held under the original agreement of 1997. The “spirit of Pratica di Mare” is just a “spirit”, that is a ghost, because the Russian stance is neither cooperative nor included in a common feeling.

There are also purely tactical reasons which prompted Russia to refer to the Agreement of 1997, rather than the next steps. In 1997, the “parties” were those emerged from the Cold War, with the exception of German reunification. If by 1997 you must start again, then, all Central Europe goes back to being a chessboard on which to move checkers and assert claims.

This, in formal terms and procedures. In substantive terms, the draft of the new Treaty provides that safety is not “shared”, but mutual and that therefore no action can be brought by either party, if such action affects the safety of others. It is not, of course, to reaffirm the illegality of military aggression, but to include among actions detrimental to the legitimate interests even the conclusion of agreements or accession to alliances. In essence, Russia would veto any modification of the formal political framework in Europe, as the entry of new members to NATO.

NATO countries have agreed to defend a “community of values”, while the security architecture proposed by Moscow seems to want to return the forms and mechanisms that are typical of Europe that was, before the advent of large totalitarian ideologies and the clot of alliances among democracies.

Initial responses of Western states to Moscow's proposal were cautious, but there have been already openly hostile reactions. If the logical premises of earlier proposals made by Russia will be confirmed during the negotiations over the coming months, the number of countries that

Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe

respond negatively will definitely increase. It is quite clear that Russia's proposals for a new "European security architecture " involve an overrun of both the OSCE and NATO, and the most ambitious political and military prospects of integration within the European Union. Few countries seems available to such a revolution. Consequently, the political price for those who wish to support the indispensability of a dialogue with Russia will tend to increase. One thing is, in fact, hope for the very cordial and cooperative relations with Moscow, and another to position itself within NATO between those who want to engage who made a formal proposal to "overcome" NATO itself.

The Afghan Theater



Afghanistan-Pakistan 2010 proof of facts of the new american strategy

Fausto Biloslavo

2010 will be the crucial year for American President Barack Obama's Afghan strategy. In December 2009 he ordered a further increase in the number of troops. In 2010 the international force in Afghanistan will be increased to 140,000. Italy is concentrated in the Western sector and will increase its contingent to about 1000 troops. In 2010 the surge will see troop levels rise to numbers comparable to those of the Soviet occupation in the eighties. The considerable rise in troops, however, will not be of much use if the allied strategy is not applied in its entirety. It is not possible to win in Afghanistan only with the force of arms. One must also be committed even more to winning over the 'hearts and minds' of the population by focusing on rebuilding and development, creating work and providing governance.

The final objective must be the transfer of security to the local forces based on the following principles: "clear, hold, build and transfer".

The indication of July 2011 as the date for the start of a gradual withdrawal was hazardous and risks leading the Taliban to thinking that the Americans want to pull out.

This year will see another important political appointment for Afghanistan – the parliamentary and regional elections. After the negative experience of the Presidential vote in August, which was marred by voter corruption, polemics and a low turn-out, the idea of postponing the election by at least a year is gathering support. The Afghan government said in January that it had reached a consensus to hold parliamentary elections this spring over the objections of international organizations and Western governments

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his new government will have two other challenges to deal with: the fight against corruption and the negotiations with the Taliban.

Afghanistan is not Iraq, nor is it Vietnam but a local approach to the problem will not suffice. The solution must be regional and must include Pakistan in the first place. The American strategy cannot succeed if the Pakistan question, defined as a 'third key risk' after the Afghan crisis and the Al Qaida threat, is not dealt with.

The White House is well aware that victory can be achieved in Afghanistan only by effective action in the Pakistan hinterland where the insurgents are based. There will be increased use of targeted attacks using remote control airplanes and intelligence operations will be intensified. The field of action will be widened to include the province of Baluchistan, where the leaders of the Afghan Taliban have taken refuge. The Pakistanis, however, are reluctant to attack the extremists who have also maintained links with the ISI, Islamabad's intelligence agency.

The Afghan Theater

The strengthened fight against the Taliban and terrorism is connected up with a chaotic political situation in Pakistan. The Supreme Court's cancellation of an amnesty for crimes of corruption has placed President Asif Ali Zardari, the government and some leading entrepreneurs in a very difficult situation.

This judicial blow risks further upsetting the stability of a country which is already under serious terrorist threat from the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas.

AFGHANISTAN

The year of the Soviet-level 'surge'

In 2010 the number of International troops in Afghanistan will reach 140,000. This number is even greater than the average number of troops that the Soviets employed (about 120,000 men) when they invaded and occupied the country in the eighties.

The additional reinforcements decided in December by President Barack Obama (32,000 men), will increase the American contingent to 98,000. NATO already has more than 30,000 men in the country and plans to send in seven to eight thousand more. What this means is that the request from Isaf commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, for 40,000 more men is effectively being granted.

This sizeable increase in troops, however, will be of little use if the allied strategy is not fully applied. It is impossible to win solely through force of arms in Afghanistan. The final aim must be the transfer of security to the local forces. The re-designed strategy is based on the following principles: "Clear, hold, build and transfer"¹. The US reinforcements will be employed above all in the south and east of the country where the Taliban threat is most incisive.

There will be an advance in particular along the Pakistan border with the aim of reducing the insurgents' operational capacities and cutting off the links with the hinterlands in the tribal area along the frontier.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the US forces will be used to 'take the initiative'² in those 11 of the 34 provinces in which the insurgents currently have the upper hand.

McChrystal seems to want to replicate, at least in part, the Soviet tactic of gaining control of the urban centres and of the main roads while abandoning the more remote outposts. The risk in this tactic is that it will leave the Taliban the free run of the isolated areas. The second objective (hold) is to gain control on the ground in order to immediately afterwards (build) rebuild not only the local security forces but also to promote development, work and better governance.

At present the Afghan institutions are undermined by a lack of credibility caused by levels of corruption which rise proportionally the further one travels from the capital and the Provincial capitals.

More than winning the Afghan 'hearts and minds' an effort must be made to fill their stomachs,

¹ *Obama's New Strategy in Afghanistan: The Proof Will Lie in the Success of Its Execution* By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman December 2, 2009

² Deposition to the US Senate's Defence Commission – Washington 2 December 2009

The Afghan Theater

to provide rules and institutions that do not rip off the citizens, to help create economic growth and new jobs.

This calls for a commitment which is less military and more civilian. For this reason, President Obama hopes in 2010 to increase the number of cooperation specialists from 300 to 975 in February.³ The civilian experts “will partner with Afghans over the long term to enhance the capacity of national and sub-national government institutions and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors so that Afghans can defeat the insurgents who promise only more violence”⁴.

What is partially new is the transfer of responsibility for security into the hands of the Afghans and it is this that makes the effect of the surge so crucial. This is a focal point in the Afghan challenge, one which has only been substantially invested in over the past two years (See the chapter entitled *The issue of the Afghan security forces*). According to the White House, July 2011 should be the date on which security begins to be handed over to the Afghan forces and the US forces begin to withdraw some troops, at least from among the ranks of the reinforcements sent in 2009-10.

The final deadline for the so-called “endgame”, that is, an acceptable pacification of Afghanistan, could be 2017. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, on one hand, is committing himself to the process of transferring responsibility for security over the next five years but he has also expressed extreme caution by declaring that “the government will not be capable of maintaining control with the resources it can call on for the next 15-20 years”. There is a danger that the indication of a date on which to begin a gradual withdrawal, even if it is only of those troops sent as reinforcements, might lead the Taliban to think that American disengagement is close, that all they have to do is resist for another year and a half, inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible and await the American withdrawal. The sending of new troops almost seemed like the announcement of an exit strategy even if the road ahead is long and full of obstacles.

General David Petraeus, the head of Centcom, has stressed that the coming months will be even more demanding than 2008 was. Over the past two years the Taliban have reemerged, the ISAF mission has not remained on the defensive and as a result the number of skirmishes and attacks has risen.

Unfortunately new insurgent groups have formed, such as the ever more dangerous one in the north, in the German sector, where Gulbuddin Hekmatya, a Taliban ally, born in a Pashtun enclave.

"The war will get even tougher before things get better – General Petraeus explained – it will take years to take full control of the situation".

Another focal point in 2010 and 2011 will be the role of the NATO allies who will commit themselves to sending around seven thousand new troops as reinforcements over the coming

³Obama's New Strategy in Afghanistan: The Proof Will Lie in the Success of Its Execution By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman December 2, 2009.

⁴ From Obama’s speech at West Point on the increase in troops in Afghanistan – 2 December 2009

The Afghan Theater

months⁵. Germany and France, which have already got 4,365 and 3,095 soldiers on the ground, respectively, will decide on whether to send more troops following the international conference on Afghanistan that will take place on 28 January in London. During a visit to Moscow on 16 December last, the NATO secretary, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, asked Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to supply helicopters for Afghanistan. "I think Russia could contribute in a very concrete way by providing helicopters, helicopter training and spare parts", he said. The Russians have not, for the moment, given a positive response, but they are said to be willing to help combat narco-trafficking which uses contraband channels through their country.

The real problem for NATO, however, is that the mandate for the 2,100 Dutch contingent, stationed in the difficult province of Uruzgan, expires in 2010. The Dutch could maintain a presence in other sectors, such as civilian-military cooperation.

The most worrying deadline is that of the Canadian contingent working in the Kandahar zone. This is a contingent of 2,800 soldiers, which has lost 133 men, a figure close to the combined French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish losses. Canadian involvement in Afghanistan is extremely unpopular at home, and it will be very difficult to extend the date fixed for withdrawal – 2011.

The aim, according to Michele Fournoy, US Undersecretary of Defense, is that Canada and the Netherlands, "stay with us. In terms of the movement of forces, we hope to have the (US and NATO) reinforcements operative everywhere in the first half of 2010".

Afghanistan is not Iraq, nor is it Vietnam, but as we will see, a local approach will not suffice to solve the problem. The solution must be a regional one, beginning with Pakistan.

Italian Reinforcements

In 2010, the Italian contingent, concentrated in the Western sector of Afghanistan⁶, will rise by 1000 men. The troop presence will, on average, be 3,700. Sometimes the number will be a little higher but, according to Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa, "it will remain under 4,000"⁷. 200 Carabinieri, "all of whom are already available", will be sent to train new units of the Afghan Police. At the moment just 60 are present in the country."

NATO had asked Italy to send 1,600 more soldiers to Afghanistan but the country's willingness has, in any case, been appreciated by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. She defined Italy as "a strong ally playing a leading role". The reinforcements should be operative in the second part of 2010 and will be employed to form the fourth Battle group. In all probability the Italian contingent will reassume complete control of the sector West, the Southern part of which borders on the turbulent Helmand province and had passed into the hands of the Americans and the English last spring.

⁵ The reinforcements so far announced by each country are: ITALY: 1000 (3700 total) 1000 (2.795) POLAND: 600 (1910) SPAIN: 500 (1500) PORTUGAL: 120 (145) GREAT BRITAIN: 500 plus the 700 troops sent for the August presidential elections who will not be brought home (9.000) GEORGIA: 1000 SOUTH KOREA: 400 HUNGARY: 200 (360).

⁶ The four provinces of Badghis, Herat, Ghor and Farah

⁷ Declaration given to the Foreign Affairs and Defence commissions of the Italian Camera and Senate, 10 december 2009

The Afghan Theater

The southern districts of Bakwa, Gulistan and Delaram cost the lives of at least thirty marines working there. Most deaths were caused by land mines. The special corps of Task Force 45 have already worked in the zone. This force will now be strengthened. An Omlt (Operational mentoring and liaison team) is working in Delaram in a (former Soviet), advance base along with Afghan units on the strategic ring road around the city.

Minister La Russa has also announced an increase in the number of vehicles, included helicopters, transport planes and armored cars (the new Freccia). The 4 Amx fighter bombers and 4 remote control Predators make the Italian the third largest allied air contingent (after the Americans and the English).

The only limit is that the bombers cannot bomb but can only take photographs and gather intelligence information. This situation is bound to become a problem during the Italian mini-surge in 2010.

The vote for parliament

Elections are due to be held for the Afghan parliament in 2010. These elections should take place in May 22, but following the negative experience of the presidential elections in August, which were marred by voter corruption, disputes and a low turn-out, the idea of postponing the election by at least a year is gathering support. An OSCE report, written by the observers at the presidential elections, has strongly recommended that the parliamentary elections be delayed until at least the most basic conditions for democratic elections are more firmly in place⁸. The report also proposes a new electoral calendar which would provide for elections once every three years until 2027 and not one year after the next as currently happens.

The Americans and the English already support the idea of postponing the elections as they are worried that they would distract the reinforcements involved in the surge from the main objective of establishing security in the provinces which are still overrun by the Taliban. The local elections, which it is felt are not practicable at present, are due to be held along with the elections for parliament. Even the district boundaries have not yet been definitively drawn up. Some European governments, on the other hand, have voiced doubts about postponing the elections and argued that the Afghan Constitution and the pre-established electoral dates should be respected.

The Afghan government said on January that it had reached a consensus to hold parliamentary elections this spring over the objections of international organizations and Western governments.

Wide-reaching reforms, including constitution changes, are needed to push the country towards becoming a stable democracy. Because these reforms are so difficult and because a broad agreement is needed to achieve them, it is very possible that Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai's Tajik

⁸ ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN - PRESIDENTIAL AND PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS 20 August 2009 - OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION SUPPORT TEAM FINAL REPORT Warsaw 8 December 2009.

The Afghan Theater

rival in the August elections and the subsequent dispute, will be brought into the process. Abdullah could be nominated president of the National Reform Commission. The Europeans, including Italy, have pressed Karzai so that this may happen.

The formation of the new government will also have an impact on the critical year ahead. Until middle of January the Parliament rejected most of Karzai's nominees for cabinet posts and expressed discontent with the candidates' competence.

Karzai has tried to recycle most of the ministers from his previous government, favoring the technocrats that the West likes to see in power. There is no sign of the kind of decisive change needed following the elections of 20 August last. From the first list only the people in the key security roles have held on to their positions.

Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, who is liked by the Americans, Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and the Intelligence chief (Nds), Amrullah Saleh, the Tajik former collaborator of Ahmad Shah Massoud, all remained in their positions. This is a sign of continuity in a crucial moment of the American surge and of big changes in the formation of the Afghan security forces. Finance minister, Omar Zakhilwal, a pragmatic economist, has also held on to his place. Even the only one woman sits at cabinet, Equal opportunities minister, Husn Banu Ghazanfar, has been rejected.

In any case, it seems that with the new government the president will failed to shake off the negative image which has hung over him since of his second election.

A mini-poll carried out by the Afghanistan Rights Monitor⁹ last November following Karzai's taking office, shows how weak he has become. Of 500 Afghans interviewed in the capitals of the 34 provinces, 54% believe that Karzai's election is not fully legitimate because the vote was undermined by fraud. In response to the second question as to whether democratic legitimacy is important, 76% responded positively. Legitimacy is understood as a prerequisite for a transparent government capable of tackling endemic problems such as corruption and of guaranteeing public security and development. 90% of women and 80% of men believed it possible for the government to win or lose its legitimacy during its five years in power as long as the government is strong and focuses on providing essential services and on tackling the country's endemic problems.

According to a more recent poll released on January 11, Afghans are far more optimistic about their future than they were a year ago and support the presence of US troops in their country. Some 70 per cent of Afghans think their country is "going in the right direction", compared with 40 per cent a year earlier – the highest figure since 2005, according to the survey for the Bbc, Abc news and Ard of Germany.

Of those polled, 68 per cent support the presence of US troops in the country and slightly fewer – 62 per cent – support the presence of British and other troops.

⁹ A *QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY* Afghans' perceptions about legitimacy in the current Karzai government - A survey by Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM) November 2009

The Afghan Theater

Despite claims to represent the Afghan people, the Taliban won little support: 69 per cent of Afghans said they presented the greatest danger to the country's future.

Karzai's two challenges: Fighting corruption and negotiating with the Taliban

After Somalia, Afghanistan is the world's most corrupt country, according to the list published by Transparency International, an association which measures the levels of corruption in the world. The most common practices are the tariff which the police demand at the road blocks, the cut which government officials expect from businessmen, and a "tax" imposed on citizens by those working in the public administration which has to be paid in order to get anything done.

Afghan magistrates are said to be carrying out investigations into two ministers accused of corruption and the mayor of Kabul was recently sentenced to 4 years. The problem is endemic, embedded in the Afghan culture and mentality and will not be easy to root it out. On the day of his taking office, President Karzai declared war on corruption, even if his own brothers are suspected of being involved. The first step is the setting up of an anti-corruption taskforce but Karzai has been reluctant so far to remove members of his own government who are suspected of pocketing bribes.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the president and accused him of "not taking enough steps to combat graft". On 15 December Karzai opened a three-day anti-corruption conference in Kabul. Us Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, would like to see drastic action being taken beginning with International aid.

"The reality is that the International presence in Afghanistan has supplied a sizeable influx of money and contracts", Gates explained, underlining the need to avoid allowing this money ending up in the wrong hands.

2010 should be the year of the "war" against corruption. Afghanistan's international partners are ready to apply strong pressure to make this happen. The international community is determined to provide financing and aid, both at local and central levels, by bypassing the corrupt structures and favoring the honest ones.¹⁰ The Americans will persist with the UN mission in the country as long as it is committed to this fight. At the same time, the contracts given by the US and ISAF forces must be examined and checked by specifically appointed groups of experts.

Karzai want to summon a session of the Loya Jirga, the traditional tribal assembly, in 2010, to discuss the vital issue of talks with the Taliban. According to Hamid Elmi, a spokesman for the President: "The Taliban will be invited to take part in (the Jirga) and if they refuse to do so, then tribal chiefs will be asked to find ways of how to go ahead with the negotiations agenda".

Mullah Muhammad Tayyeb Agha, recently appointed head of the Taliban Political Council, offered a partial reply in the Arab newspaper, *Al Hayat*, to Karzai's latest attempt to open negotiations: "We have never been opposed to dialogue. It was the enemies of the Talibans who refused to negotiate with us – he told the Arab paper Tayyeb Agha – however the sharia cannot

¹⁰ *Obama's New Strategy in Afghanistan: The Proof Will Lie in the Success of Its Execution* By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman December 2, 2009

The Afghan Theater

be negotiated and we can never accept the presence of foreign military forces on our territory". In his opinion, the negotiations should be held with the international community which has ruled out this possibility at present, and insisted that the Afghans must reach their own agreement first. In 2010, Karzai will continue to attempt to start talks with the Taliban and with Hezb i Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's armed party, while on the ground he will attempt to enlist further members of the insurgency or local commanders as part of the National reconciliation plan.

Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, head of the Peace and Reconciliation commission in Kabul, claims that 9,000 insurgents have laid down their arms in return for economic help, the chance of work and the promise that they will not be prosecuted for their roles in the armed conflict.

The problem is that often the government's promises are not kept, except perhaps at the start, and this causes, in some cases, a return to insurgency.

The problem of the Afghan security forces

The key to the Afghan strategy, in terms of finding a way out, is the transfer of responsibility for security to the local forces.

The objective in 2010 will be to have 134,000 men in the Ana (Afghan national army). Over the coming 4-5 years the aim will be to enlist a total of 400,000 men in this force. General William Caldwell, US head of training, believes that more than 50% of the number must be ready by mid-2011 when the gradual American withdrawal will begin.

The numbers planned are 159,000 soldiers and 123,000 policemen although more realistic estimates suggest a figure of 250,000 men in total. Last year both the army and the police each numbered fewer than 100,000 men. The problem is not only one of the quantity but also of the quality of the Afghan security forces.


The police is, for the most part, unreliable. The army kandaks (battalions) are better placed but not all are capable of engaging in combat operations without the help of the international troops. The problem is that the international community got involved late and badly in the birth of the Afghan security forces (Ansf).

The Bush administration failed to seriously finance the development of the army until 2007 (*see figure 1*)¹¹.

¹¹ *Shaping Afghan National Security Forces: What it Will Take to Implement President Obama's New Strategy* By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman with the Assistance of Adam Mausner December 10, 2009

The Afghan Theater

Figure1




At the start of 2009 half the trainers and mentors supposed to be working on the ground were still not operative (see figure 2). This problem only began to be tackled seriously last summer. As to the Anp (Afghan national police), following the failed German efforts in the early years, the task was passed over to the Americans. Our Carabinieri will play a key role. They are already training the paramilitary police corps.


The Afghan Theater

Figure 2: Trainers and Mentors


Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors



The Afghan Theater



Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:



The Afghan Theater

The training, equipping and upkeep of one Afghan soldier costs 25,000 dollars per year. A small figure compared to the costs of Western soldiers. It will not be enough, however, to simply finance the recruitment adequately in order to reach the target of 400,000 Afghans destined to take control of security.

Training, equipment provision, the fight against internal corruption, the achievement of an ethnic balance in the security forces, salaries, family support for soldiers and police, Taliban infiltration, all these are problematic issues that will have to be addressed if the target is to be reached. “The US will lose the war in Afghanistan (...)” – according to Anthony H. Cordesman¹² of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington - “Such action is only a part of the strategy needed to win in Afghanistan, but no other effort towards victory will matter if the Afghan people cannot be given enough security and stability to allow successful governance, the opportunity for development, and an established civil society and rule of law that meets Afghan needs and expectations”.

PAKISTAN

The Pakistan front

The American strategy cannot be successful unless the Pakistan problem is addressed. Cordesman calls this “a third key risk”, after Afghanistan itself and the Al Qaida threat. The often cited risk of the nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of extremists is exaggerated but Pakistan will still struggle to find stability in 2010. The White House knows that victory can be achieved in Afghanistan only through decisive action in the Pakistan hinterland where the insurgents lurk. In order to take such action, according to US press leaks, President Obama is moving forward on two fronts. On the one hand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other members of the administration, such as General James Jones, National Security Advisor, will continue to bring pressure to bear on the Pakistan authorities. The aim is to convince them to tackle the extremist groups, including those that have been closest to Islamabad’s intelligence service (ISI – Inter Services Intelligence). The security forces are fighting against the Pakistan Taliban and the foreign combatants linked to Al Qaida, but they are not applying the same pressure against the Afghan Taliban and the extremist networks such as the one founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, an ISI ally since the times of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

On the military front, Obama has authorized an increase, in 2010, in the number of attacks to be carried out by remote controlled planes in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Around 50 such attacks in 2009 are said to have eliminated 415 people including a large number of foreign terrorists. Sometimes, however, the collateral damage, that is the civilian victims, causes anti-American reaction in the region. The new strategy for Pakistan will see the American drones operative in a wider field of action that will include the Afghan Taliban and their safe refuges in Baluchistan, the western province of Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan and Iran, where a separatist movement is active. Here both the anti-Iranian Sunnite terrorist group Jundallah and the Afghan Taliban find refuge. In Quetta, provincial capital of Baluchistan, prominent exponents of the Shura, the political-military Taliban council, are said to be seen. Alongside an

¹² Ibidem

The Afghan Theater

intensification of the carefully targeted US air attacks, there will be an increase in intelligence work and in special operations. Many Pakistani analysts, such as Tanvir Ahmed Khan, of the Institute for Strategic Studies, fear that “the Americans would be really tempted to go after them at a scale we haven't seen before, mostly likely with drones and perhaps also with special operations.”

Anti-American feeling in the country is strong and former general Talat Masood, now a commentator in Pakistani newspapers, fears that scaling up of attacks in Baluchistan could be extremely destabilizing. On announcing the Afghan surge, President Obama was, however, extremely clear when he said: “We need a strategy that works on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”¹³

The Pakistani do not want to attack all the extremists

The American strategy in Afghanistan can be successful in 2010 only if Pakistan collaborates convincingly in the effort to root out all the Taliban strongholds in the tribal areas. In mid-December, Pakistan's prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, announced that operations in southern Waziristan had been concluded. This was one of the biggest and most important offensives against the extremists in the tribal zones in recent years. It involved 30,000 soldiers. It is not clear if all the objectives were achieved but what is certain is that the head of Pakistan's Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, managed to take refuge, along with many of his men, in nearby Orokzai. Gilani has said that the armed forces intended to continue operations in this zone but the problem is far more complex and ambiguous than it appears.

This year the Islamabad government and its military leaders will be forced to decide what to do about the Afghan Taliban and the famous Haqqani network hidden in the Pakistan tribal areas.¹⁴ According to Bill Roggio on his informative The Long War Journal site¹⁵ “the Pakistani have rejected American requests to take on the Haqqani network”. The military leaders continue to see this network not only as a part of the Afghan Taliban Shura but as a strategic regional deterrent against its Indian rival and against some other Afghan players long considered hostile to Islamabad.

In addition, incisive action against these extremists would risk causing even deeper divisions in the ISI ranks and might cause resistance among the Pakistani officers not keen on fighting on the US side.

There is nothing casual about the fact that the new offensive in Orokzai is proceeding very slowly. The Pakistani authorities have not ruled out negotiations with the Taliban through the

¹³ Obama's New Strategy in Afghanistan: The Proof Will Lie in the Success of Its Execution - *The Role and Risks of Pakistan* By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman December 2, 2009

¹⁴ The charismatic leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani from the Zadran Pashtun clan in the Afghan Khost province. He was famous during the war against the Soviets and was made a minister by the Taliban. He took refuge in Pakistan, in northern Waziristan. Since 2001 his insurgency network has been under the command of his son Sirajuddin. The Haqqani network is responsible for some terrible attacks such as the attempt on President Karzai in 2008 and the suicide bombing of the Hotel Serena in Kabul. It is operative in the Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan.

¹⁵ <http://www.longwarjournal.org/>

The Afghan Theater

religious Jamaat i Islami party. Truces and agreements have been negotiated in the past only to then fail miserably.

In 2010 Pakistan does not appear to want to penetrate Northern Waziristan, the stronghold of the Haqqani network, or other areas in Taliban hands considered less dangerous by Islamabad. Disputes with the US seem inevitable. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, did not mince her words on 12 December in New York when she spoke at the inauguration of the American Pakistan Foundation. The insurgency problem is not limited to the Taliban against whom the Pakistani have launched several offensives: "There are other terrorist groups that have opened training camps in Pakistan, camps from which global attacks are being planned along with the war against the soldiers of the 42 nations in Afghanistan".

Political chaos in Pakistan

On 16 December last, Pakistan's supreme court annulled the controversial National reconciliation order. In practice, this was a corruption amnesty decreed in 2007 by then President Pervez Musharraf. The decree derived from an agreement between Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistani Popular Party and the General-president, and it cancelled the corruption trials which had been initiated against a number of public functionaries and political representatives. Bhutto herself and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, figured among those benefitted from this decree. Zardari went on to become president following the emotional reaction to his wife's death and the Popular Party's victory in the elections.

The court's decision allows for the reopening of trials against some 6,000 people including numerous high profile politicians and businessmen. This has shaken Pakistan's power system and involves the president even if Zardari faces no immediate risks as he is protected by the immunity allowed to the head of state. He may, however, be tried at the end of his mandate.

Politically, however, the court's decision has provided an opening for the opposition which has called for the president to resign in the light of ongoing accusations of corruption. Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Muslim League (Pml-N), the main opposition party, has asked Zardari to step aside "for obvious questions of morality". In reality, Sharif is trying better position himself for the 2013 elections.

The problem is that the tension around Zardari is also being felt within the Popular party. The president has been nicknamed "the invisible one". While determined to stay in his position, he seems willing to give up some of the most important powers which had been seized by Musharraf, such as the power to dissolve parliament and nominate the chiefs of the armed forces. In return he may be able to avoid resigning. The political chaos does not look like lessening in the coming months but will probably worsen.

The annulment of the Amnesty has been the cause of some embarrassing situations. Defence minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, a close ally of Zardari, ended up on a list of 248 people who are not allowed to leave the country. In December he was stopped at the airport while attempting to leave for China on government business. Another of the President's men, Interior minister, Rehman Malik, is being investigated. It is to be expected that the anti-corruption measures will hit other personalities close to the head of state, such as the minister from the Sindh provincial government, Agha Siraj Durrani, the former director of the Pakistan Steel Mills, Usman Farooqui, and Munawar Talpur, Zardari's brother in law.

The Afghan Theater

This judicial coup has plunged Pakistan's political system into chaos and done big damage to the country's stability at time when it is already struggling to cope with the threats posed by the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas and the terrorism which strikes at its major cities.

Africa



2010: Africa, yes you "could"!

Maria Egizia Gattamorta

Africa in 2009 will face significant moments (general elections, the long wave of the global financial crisis, the radical Islamic regurgitation) without the necessary preparation and -as a cracked system of communicating vessels – will transmit instability in the various regions and not development and democracy. The triumph of hope remains postponed for now!

The perspective analysis of last year ended with these words. The suggested overview put in evidence some themes: the crisis which were in development and were expected to continue in the following months, the hot areas, some issues related to elections, the characteristics of the North which have no possibility of political change on one hand and of a sub-Saharan African band with a crystallized system on the other. Thus, the overall picture permitted to say that the continent was sick of its managers (with rare exceptions) and that would require good governance and reforms to change the fate of the vast area south of the Mediterranean.

The prediction proved correct, fulfilling in many ways. Therefore, after this time frame, is it near the triumph of hope? What are the perspectives for the next twelve months? First, we should consider the agenda and the issues that closely concern the African space.

Paraphrasing a nowadays famous phrase of President Obama visiting Ghana on July 2009 and considering the actual opportunities, that could turn into a dangerous risk or valuable benefits, we could say that in 2010 "Africa, yes you could!"

The elections in 2010: essential but not sufficient condition for the health of the African democracy

The elections on the agenda can be considered as the starting point for a perspective analysis of 2010¹.

The presidential elections are scheduled in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sudan, Tanzania and Togo. Angola was expected to be in the group of the countries having to renew the highest office, but, as the parliament – that were elected on September – has approved a new constitution, the statements made on December by President José Eduardo dos Santos seem to indicate a delay of three years.

¹cf. <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/calendar2010.htm>

Africa

On the other hand, national assemblies will be changed (in whole or in part) in Burundi, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea Conakry, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome, Sudan, and Tanzania.

Local elections are scheduled in Conakry, Guinea, Mauritius, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda.

Several questions have risen about the possibility of changing the leadership of the State. However, 2010 should not reserve large surprises in this regard.

As for Burkina Faso, will the clever Compaorè, who is proving to be a shrewd diplomat abroad, be able, as candidate of the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, to respond to the opposition, represented by Stanislas Bénéwendé Sankara (Union pour la renaissance/Mouvement Sankariste), or Hermann Yaméogo (Union Nationale pour la Défense de la Démocratie), with a suitable program? No problem is expected with the reaffirmation of this man who has been in power for 23 years, although he shall necessarily re-orient attention and forces to the domestic issues that he has neglected over the last three years.

As for Côte d'Ivoire, Gbagbo felt no longer threatened by Chirac's France and has been able to freely manage the program. The relationship with Sarkozy and Kouchner are of different calibre even if Paris will not allow any further delay of the vote. Passionate socialist, capable of galvanizing the crowds, with a dense network of knowledge, and, above all, with a team coached eight years in power, the outgoing President will face major candidates to be confirmed at the highest office. Among the most important, Henri Konan Bédié (HKB) of PDCI/RDA² and Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO) of Rassemblement des Républicains. Between the two, ADO seems to be in pole position, since his party is very deep-rooted in the territory, but only their alliance could seriously jeopardize the candidate of the Front Populaire Ivoirien.

As for Togo, Faure Gnassingbé (undisputed star of the last five years) will enjoy the support of the army and the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais. The opposition, represented by Union des Forces du Changement, Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau, Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine and Parti des Démocrates pour le Renouveau, will not be able to coagulate forces due to not easily solvable problems concerning the ambition of each of its leaders to be the centre of attention. Gilchrist Olympio (although there are serious doubts about his candidacy), Edem Kodjo andYawovi Agboyibo have so strong personalities that the scene will be difficult to manage. Again, the Eyadema dynasty is expected to continue without major problems. The divisions and family jealousies were cleverly resolved in 2009 with the 'elimination' of two brothers (Kpatcha Ganissingbé and Rock Gnassingbé)³, who had too bulky personalities and aspired to a leadership change.

As for Rwanda, Paul Kagame of the Front Patriotique Rwandais will have a dozen contenders. Vincent Biruta, Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza (first woman candidate for presidential elections in the country) and Bernard Ntaganda have already expressed their candidature. Further names are expected, except for Boniface Rutayisire (representative of the party Banyarwanda), who does not see the minimum conditions to participate in the competition. Kagame has many successes on his side (mostly the economic ones but not only). Considered by some as a skilful operator, instigating violence in the Great Lakes, by others as a reliable partner, Kagame is in fact an

² For more details on PDCI/RDA cf. http://pdcirda.org/?page_id=39

³ cf. http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/112/article_3494.asp

Africa

indispensable ally for England and the United States in Central and Eastern theatre. The entry of Kigali in the Commonwealth gave substance to the close link with the Anglo-Saxon world, confirming the orientation of the presidency to Washington and London. The controversies of last few years with France appear to be in the way of composition, as shown by the visits of Bertrand Kouchner (January) and Nicholas Sarkozy (probably on February), which were put on the agenda.

Nevertheless, international attention focuses on elections in Sudan. In a recent Policy Briefing, the prestigious think tank 'International Crisis Group'⁴ points out that the country is sliding towards a violent break-up, and identifies the causes of degeneration in the lack of implementation suffered by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement. Each of the protagonists is responsible for the dramatic state that may definitively precipitate into implosion during the coming months. Despite the limits of the present CPA implementation, according to the authors, the April elections will take place because they are wanted the major parties (National Congress Party-NCP and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-SPLM), albeit for different and in, in a certain way, wrong reasons.

Thus, the next elections will witness that the African democracy does not always follow a linear path. Sometimes its way twisted and it certainly needs a long maturation. Two factors are essential for the latter: an efficient and comprehensive basic education system, combined with the strengthening of civil society.

The evolution of African regional organizations in 2010

Another factor to consider to 'forecasting' 2010 concerns the development of regional and continental organization. What can be expected about them?

AMU⁵, IGAD⁶, ECCAS⁷, CEN-SAD⁸, COMESA⁹, EAC¹⁰ are not yet able to harmonize the interests of area: they are too weak and suffer bilateral frictions (the reference is to the Algerian-Moroccan conflict that has been blocking the AMU action for many years).

ECOWAS¹¹ and SADC¹² are trying to influence the crisis of the respective areas with varying success.

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Conakry and Togo in West Africa, Madagascar and Zimbabwe in the South is a clear example.

While allowing the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to expand his diplomatic role in recent years, the first three cases managed by ECOWAS witnessed a noteworthy cohesion between the area partners. Significant efforts will be required in the short term. A targeted

⁴ *Sudan Preventing Implosion*, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing n° 68, December 17th 2009

⁵ Arab Maghreb Union

⁶ Intergovernmental Authority for Development

⁷ Economic Community of Central African States

⁸ Community of Sahel-Saharan States

⁹ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

¹⁰ East African Community

¹¹ Economic Community of West African States

¹² Southern African Development Community

Africa

pressure together with the availability to accompany *fair and free* elections is needed in order to effectively normalise the political situation of the three countries in question.

Problems for the ECOWAS may come up precisely from Abuja. Three situations, namely, may start a crisis: in Saudi Arabia the prolonged absence of Yar'Adua for health reasons and the attempts to remove him from power, in the Niger Delta the resumption of the MEND actions and in the North the interfaith confrontation between Muslim and Christian communities. Again Nigeria proves to be a colossus with feet of clay and the next few months may witness its fractures.

In the Southern region, the next few months will severely test the efficiency of SADC towards Madagascar and Zimbabwe.

At Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina frustrated the work of the mediator Joaquim Chissano who had created the conditions for agreements in Maputo (August 9th) and Addis Ababa (November 6th).

How will the organization operate? What pressure will be able to lead to the return of legality? All the skill of the chosen Mozambican negotiator will be required to bring the protagonists of the Madagascar question back to the negotiating table.

Firmness is instead required to help overcome the stalemate in the national unity government of Harare. During the last few months the ZANU-PF of Robert Mugabe and the two factions of the MDC of Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara have not been able to work profitably and there are still deep differences between parties. After the period of the quiet diplomacy of the former President Mbeki (too unbalanced towards of Mugabe) now the mediation of Jacob Zuma, who has always been considered closer to the demands of the MDC, must gain weight. Assuming that Zuma will impose himself as negotiator, his leading capacity within the SADC and the actual consequences on the Zimbabwean government must be evaluated.

The African Union, then, seems to be fully hetero-directed, hesitant and subdued. The test bench, in this case, is its position towards Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In the case of Khartoum, the order of arrest for President El Beshir issued by the International Criminal Court-ICC prosecutor Moreno Ocampo was severely criticised and ignored by the African countries (except Kenya and Botswana), while the leader of the National Congress Party is continuing to determine the national policy lines and has been greeted with full honours from African peers, as well as from the Arab ones and otherwise.

While focusing on the theme of communication technologies in Africa, the 14th AU summit, that will be held in Addis Ababa between January 25th and February 2nd ¹³, shall deal with issues related to the numerous present crisis (from Somalia to Darfur, from Madagascar to Zimbabwe, from Niger to Guinea Conakry and Ivory Coast), the unconstitutional changes of government, the procedures for the NEPAD implementation (stagnating) and examine the latest report of the Commission responsible for the African Peer Review Mechanism.

Provided that the regional brigades have reached proper levels of preparation, attention should be paid also to the African Standby Force, which will be operational by 2010.

¹³ The chosen theme is 'New Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities for Development'

Africa

The risk factors in 2010

Which are the risk factors for Africa of 2010? They are numerous, of varying importance and dimension. Terrorism, corruption, drug trade, strong migratory pressures from different regions to the North of the continent, piracy, AIDS and malaria are elements that can destabilise the security of the region.

Terrorist-like operations in the continent are linked to the activity of Al Qaeda. On the North, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb continues to operate (AQIM), in Somalia the various groups of Islamic radicals are directly linked to the network of Bin Laden and there could be Al Qaeda cells also in Nigeria.

Maghreb, Mauritania and Algeria are gearing up to counter latent threats.

After the recent kidnappings of Spanish aid workers and Italian tourists, the government of Nouakchott considered that the strengthening the legislation against terrorism was necessary. In Algeria, the attacks have decreased thanks to the widespread contrast action carried out by the security services and the Popular National Army. The *emirs of terror* were neutralised in Kabylia, both on the East and the centre of the country.

In Somalia attacks by Al Shabaab and Hisbul Islam (forces that are increasingly rooted in the territory) are continuing. Thanks to an extensive organization, the Islamic radicals proved that they can directly hit the transitional government.

Nigeria could be the other country to which pay attention. The country is the scene of increasingly heated sectarian clashes occurring between Muslim and Christian communities in the North. The terrain is favourable for Al Qaeda which may gain followers among upper-middle-class youth.

Corruption undermines and weakens the system: this is a further risk factor the economic and social system. International investors flee the uncertainty and the unfair competition that are lived daily in most African countries. If Botswana, Cape Verde, Seychelles are the “virtuous countries” and provide alternative routes, Somalia, Sudan and Chad are the “most corrupted examples”.

The *drug trade* is a further risk factor. Western region has been the protagonist of shady dealings particularly in the last few months, but the Eastern one is not outdone¹⁴. According to latest UNODC reports¹⁵, a structured network with international connections has emerged. A multinational inter-force coalition is required to block trades. U.S. and Europe should provide resources and training to combat groups operating in the band running from Senegal to Nigeria.

Strong migratory pressures coming from central-eastern and central-western areas are likely to create irresistible pressures for the countries of the North. The desperate people flee from Somalia, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire because of intolerable political situations, but their flight undermines the stability of Maghreb countries, which are no longer able to filter out thousands of immigrants or refugees and have to deal with newcomers on their territory for a long time.

¹⁴ According to the UNODC, the conflict situation in Somalia allows Afghan heroin staging in the Horn of Africa, as well as transactions related to illicit weapons, toxic waste, human trafficking

¹⁵ cf. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf and <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/dfa/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf>

Africa

Behind these shifts, there could be more than political reasons: international experts emphasise the link between climate change and migratory flows¹⁶.

The phenomenon is alarmingly degenerating and its change into human trafficking multiplies the strength of the risk factor.

Piracy, both in the Gulf of Aden and in the Gulf of Guinea, is a destabilizing factor for the African continent. It involves a change in shipping, an alteration of local and international economic system and an increase in the traffic of light weapons and otherwise.

During the coming months a constant and synchronized vigilance in the waters off the Horn of Africa will be crucial, which shall not result in a unilateral action but in a joint architecture involving all the actors for a long time. A link between the pan-Arab fleet (established at a summit in late June in Saudi Arabia) and the forces provided by USA, European Union, NATO, Russia, India, China and Japan may prove useful.

HIV/AIDS and malaria are two not-to-be underestimated elements. While local and international public healthcare systems have been improving, these factors continue to harm the African population. According to data from UNAIDS, World Health Organization, and NGOs specialized in this sector, a synergy between efficient local government policies and international funds is fundamental. Contemporaneously politicians and civil society in Africa shall feel more and more responsible about this subject.

The relations with the international players in 2010

We can not think of Africa of 2010 without taking into account the relations with international players. USA, Europe as a whole, France, China, India, Japan, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Venezuela, Brazil and Cuba have shown a growing interest in multilateral and bilateral dialogue with this continent.

Certainly China policy distinguishes itself for determination and foresight. Last FOCAC (Sharm el Sheikh, November 8th to 9th 2009) provided an opportunity to make a point of the situation and plan the next three years. The leadership in Beijing continues to provide funds, but not only. African opposition parties expressed their criticisms and spoke of “cosmetic investments” that do not lead to any tangible development¹⁷. The anti-China feeling is spreading and growing, although local authorities will promptly suppress it, at least for the next few years.

The United States are following two paths: the fight against terrorism in Africa and the strengthening of trade relationships. Although African governments refused to accept AFRICOM, they are aware of the need to provide different training to their troops. Thus, the joint military exercises, like the recent ones in Gabon (28th September to 8th October) and Uganda (October 16th to 25th), will become more and more frequent.

As for trade, the AGOA (African Growth Opportunity Act) laid down the rules leading to a revision of policies. On December Niger, Madagascar and Guinea Conakry were excluded from

¹⁶ 'Climate Change and Human Mobility on Africa Dialogue for a strategic cooperation between Italy and Africa', International Conference towards the G8 Summit, Rome, April 21st 2009, <http://www.cespi.it/climate-dev-africa.html>

¹⁷ cf. 'The China Man is The Rider, The African is The Horse'-Sata, Times of Zambia, December 18th 2009, <http://www.times.co.zm/>

Africa

the list of countries that are eligible for tariff benefits, which gave a clear signal to African governments. Those countries will be reintegrated into the group of beneficiaries only after filling minimum requirements set by Africa desk of the State Department.

In the coming months Europe shall work on the various chapters of the Joint Africa EU Strategy. A new approach is needed, which may be alternative to the Asian one (being most attractive because of its pragmatism).

France, on its side, is experiencing a certain tension in relationships with some traditional partners. Tunisia, Algeria, Togo have shown a certain resentment in the last few months of 2009. Sarkozy will have to use all his skill to implement the change of perspective promised at the beginning of his mandate. Two significant events are on the agenda: the France-Africa Summit on May 2010¹⁸ and the meeting at the Elysée Palace on July 14th. Presidents of fourteen former colonies will be there to celebrate 50 years of independence.

Latin America will continue to be an active player in the continent, thanks to its ability to present itself as a truly equal partner able to share wide-ranging requests such as those concerning energy, environmental protection and the fight against climate change.

Relations with Israel are very likely to become closer and closer in the next few months. The tour made by Minister Avigdor Lieberman on September 2009¹⁹ indicates a growing presence of Tel Aviv. The sectors where ties will grow stronger are agriculture, industry, telephony, trade in precious stones and security.

The African economy in 2010

Despite the international economic and financial crisis, the African economy is expected to enjoy some very interesting moments of growth.

The oil sector is not the one that is promising.

As for “black gold”, the number of oil-producing countries is increasing. Besides the top oil producers (Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Libya) there are some outsiders which should be taken into serious account. The reference is to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Uganda that are expected to check their production and start new explorations in the next twelve months. The African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA) is organising the 4th African Petroleum Congress and Exhibition (CAPE IV) that will take place in Kinshasa from March 24th to 27th. This event will host representatives from 16 African countries²⁰ and enable a frank discussion about the real chances for the continent in this sector.

¹⁸ Originally the Summit should be held in Egypt on February, but it changed site and agenda due to the question raised by the invitation of the Sudanese President El Beshir. Under the agreements, therefore, the meeting will take place next May in France.

¹⁹ Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman has visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda on September from 2nd to 10th

²⁰ The event will host delegations coming from: Angola, Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Sudan and South Africa.

Africa

Certainly oil will be a protagonist of the local economy but that role will have to be shared with agriculture, which is back on the stage. This is the new source of hope! After the crisis of 2009 ravaging their system and the dramatic food crises of recent years, Africans understood that they need to regain agricultural independence. “Africa - as some managers of the leading groups in the food sector stated - is experiencing a reconquering of its agriculture. ...The idea that African development will pass through agriculture is a new idea that is spreading very fast”²¹. Nearly thirty countries together with FAO have already drawn up detailed agricultural development plans. Now they are desperately seeking funding. Gulf countries could be interested in the operation, as they already showed in recent years.

Conclusions

These factors are certainly worthy to be taken into account for a perspective of Africa of 2010, but two further significant factors must be added. The Championships World Cup scheduled in South Africa from June 11th to July 11th will have a remarkable impact in terms of international image and local investments. The ability and the transparency shown in their management and the guarantee of personal safety will be the litmus test to understand both if the continent is mature or not and if a real development is now possible. The Local Organising Committee calculated that the competition will create 160,000 jobs and contribute approximately 4 billion dollars to the gross domestic product. An opportunity that a country like South Africa should not underestimate!

Further, two Italian associations²² have proposed to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 2010 to African women. This campaign aims to spotlight the role of women that are the silent (but ambitious) protagonists of the political and economic life in this continent. The international recognition of their abilities means the identification of a space beyond the 'Africa curses', means that even in Africa a strong-willed and pragmatic development is possible.

Both are positive signs: they encourage a different perception of the region from the outside on the one hand and an innovative response from the inside on the other.

The Obama's speech in Ghana in July 2009²³ could be a harbinger of a new landscape: *“Africa's future is up to Africans (...) In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success - strong parliaments and honest police forces; independent judges and journalists; a vibrant private sector and civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in peoples' lives (...) Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at war (...) Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at war (...) The people of Africa are ready to claim that future (...) Africa's diversity should be a source of strength, not a cause for division (...) You have the power to hold your leaders accountable, and to build institutions that serve the people (...) But these things can only be done if you take responsibility for your future. It won't be easy. It will take time and effort (...) Freedom is your inheritance. Now, it is your responsibility to build upon freedom's foundation”*.

²¹ “L’Afrique à la reconquête de son Agriculture”, Jeune Afrique n 2545-2546, October 18th to 31st 2009

²² The Italian association involved are CIPSI and Chiama l’Africa. cf. <http://www.noppaw.org/>

²³ <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/200907111110050abretnuh0.1079783.html>

Africa

With a healthy dose of realism but also with some constructive encouragement, it will be wise to say about the next 12 months, *"Africa, yes you could!"... in the hope that "could" may soon turn into "can"!*

India and China**The end of Chindia?***Nunziante Mastrolia*

As Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr stated: “Making predictions is a difficult task, particularly about the future”. However, the problem inherent in making prospective analysis is not only limited to that. Nassim Nicholas Taleb writes in the “The Black Swan” that the great error of social sciences is in the tendency to focus on “ what we think makes sense” at the risk of not foreseeing or even fail to recognize a “black swan”, a sudden event which impact has the power to alter the overall situation.

The 2008-2009 perspective weighed upon the hypothesis of an eventual reaffirmation of the Singh government: a hypothesis which made little sense considering what was then a nearly constant in Indian politics: the anti-incumbency factor, an element that characterized all elections of the government in charge. Similarly, an intensification of relations between Japan, South Korea and China has been witnessed with the hope that steps like this could prompt the people of Asia to initiate a process of political integration based on the European Union model and thus getting of all debris left behind throughout history: horrifying events, lots of violence and grief, elements that for the longest time prevented the continent from overcoming former fractures.

In Europe it was the political will that prevented the return of fratricidal wars which for centuries shook the continent and that eventually lead to economic integration. By contrast, in the case of Asia the economy and commerce tended to merge the nations but politics and history continued to divide.

One hoped for a European future for Asia but then much emphasis was put on a possible return of Haushofer's Pan-regions: those regional blocs in which the world was fragmented with the loosening of the Pax Britannica and a worn out economic and political blocs created the conditions for the for the outbreak of World War II.

In this case the motives also seems to be of economic nature: particularly in the case of China which tried to parry the blow of the collapse of the American consumer system, as a result of the ongoing crisis and because of fears of a protectionist turn in the United States, by establishing and embracing within itself a vast areas of Asian co-prosperity. Today much emphasis has been placed on the “European way”, as will be highlighted later on this essay.

However, many elements that occurred in 2009 were not foreseen earlier that year, some other elements were taken for granted or some assumptions made seemed logical at the time.

India and China

First it was assumed that the “Asian policy” by the new Democratic administration of Obama could remain constant to that of the precedent administration, at least when it comes to the bottom lines. In Asia, the Bush administration had in fact conducted a policy that followed the traditional American policy in the region (containment plus engagement and in part the enlargement of democracy, precisely the theory of democratic peace). Indeed it can be said that the administration accentuated the nature of such approach on one hand by highlighting the political importance of Beijing by launching the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (engagement) while on the other hand applying the concept of containment by custom clearing New Delhi from nuclear apartheid and trying to forge a system of reinforced cooperation between India, Japan and Australia, almost to weave an alliance along the Chinese borders, the Quadrilateral Defense Initiative, in which many could see the construction of a bulwark in order to stem Beijing, to such an extent that many expected the formation of an Asian NATO.

This approach not only angered and unnerved Beijing but among other things created fibrillation in the Korean peninsula, but, given the US refusal to also recognize Pakistan as a *de jure* nuclear power, considering the encouragement given by Washington to New Delhi to play a key role in the stabilization of Afghanistan (such hypothesis was read by Islamabad by a possible situation of encirclement by the arch-rival). Not only the tension between India and Pakistan has been increasingly growing following the stall in talks peace in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks (November 2008), but there has been increasing cooperation efforts between Islamabad and Beijing, hence also the tensions between India and China to the unresolved question of border disputes and territorial claims (particularly the Arunachal Pradesh issue).

It was then quite evident that the logic of comparison for the opposing blocs began to work in the region by adding more fractures than those already created by World War II and the Cold War and never reconstituted through a process of political integration. Earlier in 2009 it was suggested that even the United States of Obama would have kept his policies firmly stagnant in the same direction.

Obama, instead, at least as we perceive, has triggered a substantial change in the United State’s approach to the region which purpose seems to defuse the reasons for uncertainty and friction that could drive regional actors to exacerbate the confrontation and to engage in a weapons race. As Kagan writes, in a region where the game among major powers had already started, the return of history lies where chances of passing from comparison to confrontation were probably still present and strong.

Moreover, the traditional America approach to the region produced a series of dangerous contradictions. India, a rare exception to the international non-proliferation regime, was introduced by the United States as a nuclear power *de jure*. Meanwhile when Pakistan, the US strategy hub in Afghanistan war, asked for similar treatment it was answered with a definite no despite of the substantial flow of economic and military aid in the fight against terrorism.

The United States approach towards China is also not immune of contradictions: Washington “engaged” Beijing economically and financially on the highest levels, to the extent of producing a closely intertwining: Chimera. But politically and militarily Beijing was criticized on its human rights violations, was under containment and under military embargo.

In other words from the Chinese point of view America appeared to be too multifaceted and difficult to understand. Financial and economic cooperation were frequently followed by regular accusations of artificial alternation of the dollar/Yuan ratio. While Washington stated to remain

India and China

faithful to the “One China Policy” it continued to criticize Beijing for its failure to protect human and religious rights. This sounded to Beijing as if the US calling to support the regime's political opponents and an attempt to undermine China's territorial integrity: it is not to be underestimated that since 1991 all American presidents have at least met once with the Dalai Lama. The United States asked Beijing for a strong commitment towards the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula and in the management of global issues, but according to the annual reports of the Pentagon China is still described as a threat, at least on the long run. The Taiwanese issue was added to this framework: in October 2008 Bush gave the green light to the sale of 6.4 billion dollars in weapons to Taipei, a decision that definitely brought an end to the military-to-military relations between the two nations.

These contradictions create constant concerns in Beijing on regard towards the real intentions of the United States. China on the other hand, whether true or not, fears for its territorial integrity (Tibet, Taiwan, or in other words, a Kosovo situation) and the internal stability of its own system (a new Tiananmen, the eighty six thousand cases of riots and a slowdown in economic growth that undermines the foundations of the political consensus towards the regime). This apprehension is probably the source from which the friction arises between Beijing, regional players and Washington, and that fuel suspicions and fears of the long-term implications of China's ascent.

Based on the above considerations, it is not only possible that Obama is intent on eliminating the causes of friction in the region, but should also eliminate all contradictions inherent to the American foreign policy's traditional approach towards Beijing: a reset button with China, as previously occurred with Russia. The aim is to reassure Beijing politically, not only, as many have argued, for China to continue to finance the US debt. The goal is to turn off the sparks that might blow up the Asian powder keg and gain Beijing's cooperation in the resolution of regional problems (Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea), global issues (climate, re-balancing of international trade and non – proliferation) and most of all, and here comes the key issue, this approach could be designed to give confidence in Beijing to its peaceful development, and for it to be no longer considered a threat but a partner and co-tutor of the post war international system built by the United States.

On accordance to this 2010 should witness a slackening in the concept of containment and the embargo on issues like the transfer of weapons and sensitive technologies imposed on China since 1989 with the possibility of closing the channel of weapon supplies to Taipei. Obama is also establishing an indirect approach towards Beijing: not Clausewitz but Sun Tzu. In other words. Obama do not insist on an objective until the other party does not give up on the goal thus by establishing a roundabout route which leads the other party to surrender and collaborate. The first examples can be drawn from the visit of the American President to China.

Obama has not explicitly requested a revaluation of the Yuan, nor did he give a lecture on human and religious rights to the Chinese, neither did he explicitly ask Beijing to cut on polluted emissions: in other words he did not speak to the Chinese leaders in order to gather support back at home. Obama seems to apply a different line of conduct: *“in public, you have agreements in principle. In private, behind the scenes, you pursue concrete deals, keeping negotiations flexible to save face”*. Obama has understood that, due to historic reasons (the humiliation and the culture shock following the European occupation), Beijing remains extremely sensitive on the regard towards the intangibility of its fuller sovereignty and

India and China

independence and it will never make any move that might seem like a direct response to explicit order that comes from the outside, even it arrives from Washington.

In fact, a few days after the conclusion of Obama's visit, China spontaneously announced that it will start to cut on its emissions and is committed to play a leading role in making the Copenhagen Conference become a success. This has obviously pushed India towards a corner since it not lag behind China on a fundamental issue such as climate change which might undermine its ambitions to play a key role globally.

On this account if the United States is to continue this approach and if a protectionist spiral is not triggered, it is likely that Beijing will spontaneously undertake a revaluation of the Yuan.

Strong doubts remain on how such appreciation can be good for the Americans (reduction of imports) or the Chinese (increasing their purchasing power): the major risk is that prices will start to run high and inflation can erode the value of Chinese investments in America.

In the meantime, Beijing can begin to put pressure on Pyongyang for a definitive resolution of the North Korean crisis, path to escape in relation to the encirclement and the pressures of containment and have a strong say in the stabilization of Afghanistan, a voice that, on the contrary to India does not worry Pakistan at the slightest.

Confidence in China with a retrenchment to the ambitions of India. The Obama administration, as stated on the occasion of the Indian Prime Minister Singh in America, plans to make operational cooperation agreements in the nuclear field, but within the context of a more general strengthening of the international non proliferation regime. In other words, the United States are not yet disposed to back up India's ambitions to play the role of a great power, if these were to alter regional balance and cause friction and both regional and international level and above all are not prepared to meet the Indian ambitions to alter the international standards.

This does not mean that Bush's strategy was wrong. Bush had managed to break a situation of a nearly political isolation. The United States were therefore able to "engage" India. Bush's turning point was not wrong but excessive.

Obama is therefore trying to restrict the American openness policy, because as things are today, it is not only likely to exacerbate regional tensions (with Pakistan and China), but also threatens to undermine the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime and more generally the formation of a new international system of norms, valid *erga omnes* (from the fight against global warming, the fight against terrorism, the aforementioned anti-nuclear proliferation, the imposition of international standards for economic recovery, which includes the fight against tax heavens). Despite of what many observers think, it is important do not forget that Obama is showing the same, if not greater, propensity towards unilateralism although different in tone and approach. Bush's unilateralism was that of derogations: Washington reserved itself the right to be disengaged from the Westphalian international standards, and thus apply some exceptions (the pre-emptive attack on Iraq) and derogations (acknowledging India's status as a nuclear power).

The Obama presidency is moving towards the same direction but is the unilateralism to impose rules: in this case, Washington, reserves the right to place internationally bound rules and to persuade others to comply with them. That of Obama is not an imperialistic presidency, but a global presidency. America today, seems to be vision of the new President, must accompany the evolution of international relations in a post-modern direction and drive the winds of change. It is of significant importance that the Bush administration's foreign policy manifesto in Foreign

India and China

Affairs signed by Rice is entitled “Rethinking National Interest”, as that of the Democratic administration signed by Barack Obama is entitled “Renewing American Leadership”.

The attempt to move beyond the Westphalian order is quite clear in a passage on this article. According to Obama, Bush’s main mistake was that of “*largely viewing problems as state-based and principally amenable to military solutions*”. In order to move beyond this approach the previous administration should have been aware that “*the security and well-being of each and every American depend on the security and well-being of those who live beyond our borders.*” Accordingly, the function of the United States is “*to provide global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common humanity*”.

The point is that India's aspirations are still deeply embedded in the Westphalia modern logic and its ambitions to play a key role do not seem to coincide with that postmodern order made of binding rules that all nations must follow, rules of governance and joint responsibilities beyond an interpretation in the classical sense of national interest and foresees mechanisms for partial ceding of sovereignty with the example of the European Union kept in mind.

India, however, remains stuck to its view of the inviolability of its full sovereignty and full independence, feeling almost insulted that the country may have to comply with the mandatory rules drawn at international level; on this behalf it is sufficient to consider India’s positions towards the NPT, CNTBT, FMCT and to the process for the establishment of binding rules to cut on the emissions of harmful gases. In order to measure up the gap between India’s vision and the globalization policies driven by the United States it is sufficient to read the statement made by the Indian Minister of Environment during a parliament session: “*we will not accept any share coercive gas reduction, nor an indication of a coercive year peak. Instead, we planned a reduction in gas emissions by 20-25% compared to 2005 by 2020, but we will act freely.*”

For India, the year 2010, will the year it has to decide whether to participate in the formation of the new international order or continue to be immersed in the proud celebration of the Westphalia principle, particularly on regard to rules governing the principle of non-proliferation and weapons disarmament. The Non – Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will be held in 2010 which aim is to strengthen and improve the NPT. Considering the positions taken so far by the new Democratic Administration in Washington is clear that Obama (just think of his April 2009 speech in Prague) would do whatever he can for the conference to succeed unlike and thus avoid the failure of 2005 and progress has already been registered under the Conference's Preparatory Committee thanks to the increased efforts of the American delegation.

Additionally, India’s ambitions will suffer further restrictions in other respects. The Bush administration pledged to make India become a global power while Obama did not mention New Delhi among the major regional powers during his Tokyo speech while he recognized China’s role in the stabilization of South Asia and particularly for the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Obama's position deeply irritated New Delhi which opposes an increasingly internationalized Kashmiri issue and considers South Asia and the Indian Ocean it natural area of influence.

India and China

It is therefore, conceivable that the combined pressure applied by the United States and China on Islamabad and New Delhi, may lead the two countries to overcome the current stalemate and re-open the process of peace talks.

Washington's engagement has probably created false expectations in New Delhi especially now with Obama in the White House: probably the United States intends to ask India to take on a broader international breath in order to reinforce a global governance regime, however, India declines its aspirations of becoming a great power only in the sense of national interests.

In fact, "India has struggled to assert its power as almost exclusively as hard power in the casualties that followed, although it was Gandhi's radically non violence stance to demonstrate the impotence of the brute force and brought an end to the dominion of the British Empire".

After all the collective memory still remember the nuclear tests of 1998, when India was prepared to defy the world on the basis of a principle " or the politics is changed to fit the context or the context is changed to fit politics. The nuclear tests have helped us change the context", as declared by the then Advisor of National Defense Brajesh Mishra. If in this phrase the word politics is to be replaced by the word national interest (or rather, the assessment that a government works for what is best for its national interests), a clearer idea would come of what was said earlier.

If all analysis conducted so far were correct it is clear how the new Obama administration, that seems intent on turning off all reasons for friction in the region, can not grant a *carte blanche* to the power ambitions (in the classical sense) in notwithstanding the international regimes and regardless of the regional framework and needs. This means in order to avert the return of war between great powers, in order to break the logic of overlapping blocs and in order launch the region on a path of political cooperation and economic integration, India will no longer be allowed to "distort the context".

While not strictly the subject of monitoring it is also important to briefly speak of the evolutionary path which seems to have started in Japan with its regional policies. The defeat in World War II, the military occupation and the constant American protection have made of Japan, when it comes to economic terms, a country that had had a nearly one-dimensional approach both internationally and regionally: an economic power.

Additionally the American tutelage represented a major insurance for those countries that had suffered the Japanese occupation (China and South Korea), from the re-emergence of a new militarism in Tokyo. Nonetheless, at the same time, territorial disputes and the uncertainties regarding the Chinese ambitions heightened the anxiety in Seoul and Tokyo, for the gradual accumulation of economic and political power in Beijing. Even in this case the policy of containment exercised by the United States against China represented a barrier to the spread of the old frictions. In other words, the external hand the United States have had on the region has prevented the area from falling into the mechanism of hellish security dilemma in which the means used by a State to enhance its security normally result in a reduction, not necessarily intentional, in security of the other nations.

Additionally, this has prevented the two key players from investing all their weight in regional integration initiatives, so to speak, in a one – sided way. If Japan were to think of such an initiative the memory of the countries in the region would have diverged to the area of co-prosperity that the Japanese tried to forge with weapons and military occupation during World War II. If instead it is China for many this would mean a re- emergence of that Sino-centric

India and China

system that required the re-emerge of a vassal systems. Only an initiative launched jointly by Tokyo and Beijing would have worked, but the path to that was blocked by historical debris.

As mentioned earlier, in 2008 something began to change, through an intensification in political cooperation between China, Japan, and North Korea, which has been developing since the trilateral meetings at the highest level in Fukuoka (that was the first time that the three countries met following this formula, the first meeting within the context of APEC + 3 was first held in 1999) and in Beijing in 2009. Those meetings launched the hypothesis of an East Asian Community that can be a model of the European Union, an idea proposed by the new Japanese Premier Hatoyama, but immediately taken over by China and South Korea.

The victory of Hatoyama and his Democratic Party in the elections of August 2009 brings about an important element of political innovation to this framework, not only it brings an end to the long era of the Liberal Democratic Party but it becomes the carrier of a different approach regionally. Indeed in one of his first statements the new Premier officially pledged not to visit the temple of Yakusuni where they commemorated the victims of World War II and fourteen high level members of the imperial government and armed forces, who were condemned as war criminals by the international tribunal in Tokyo following the end of hostilities. In past years the visits of senior government officials, including Prime Minister Koizumi, had spread throughout Asia waves of astonishment and resentment and reignited suspicions that the ancient spirit of militarism and imperial Chinese had never died.

With one gesture Hatoyama, therefore, deleted an element that is symbolically imbued with meaning that had produced a strong shake in the relations with other countries in the region. At the same time, however, he raises to power, with an agenda which key point is to review the political and strategic relations that bind Tokyo to Washington in order to gain more room for political maneuver both regionally and internationally, through a profound change into the commitments imposed on Japan under the treaty of military cooperation between Tokyo and Washington (a subject a revision for 2010).

Nevertheless, Hatoyama during a parliament session reiterated that "the Japan-US alliance is the cornerstone of our foreign policy." The LPD opposition accused the premier of sending contradictive messages to Washington. The fact is that it is quite possible to argue that the government intends to seek a more mature relationship with United States by overcoming the limitations imposed by the defeat during World War II, the Cold War logic and find a way to bring an end to the allegiance relationship that has been going on with US.

This does not necessarily mean that once freed from the shackles and constraints that were imposed on it Japan will return to the old militarism, on the contrary if the two elements are to be converged, the new Japanese leadership could guide with Beijing a regional integration process, seeking at the same time a more balanced relationship with Washington.

In Europe West Germany's recovery of full political and military identity has been linked to the process of European unification. In other words Bonn could overcome the limitations related to having gained its prewar status only through the intensification of the European integration process: it is sufficient to think about the problem of the Ruhr and Saar, which were reassembled within the CECA, or the issue of German rearmament which should have been completed within the CED. Consider also the fact that the German opinion on every significant decision taken by the EU became practically indispensable only when Bonn became the largest contributor to the EU budget. In other words the problem of a German revival was set as

India and China

following: Germany could regain its status as a prewar by yielding some of its sovereignty in favor of communitarian organisms. The last act of this process was passing from the mark in Euro in exchange of unification.

Now it is likely that Tokyo along with Washington and in tandem with Beijing intends, with over fifty years of delay to follow the same path taken by Bonn since the fifties. The Japanese Prime Minister has proposed a solution along the lines of CECA model in order to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea, apparently linked to the exploitation of large reserves of oil and gas.

The East Asian community might be on one side the locomotive pushing the countries in the region

towards a greater political integration and on the other side the necessary framework for mutual political trust between regional players in order to overcome the set-ups that have emerged since World War II. Therefore it can be assumed that next year this process, which, had already gained an Obama vote of confidence, will witness acceleration in the conjoint efforts by the two powers in being key players in the region.

The regional framework for 2010 so far appears quite rosy and the source of such optimism can only be traced to the formulation which Obama has given to the American Foreign Policy on regard to its relations with the major regional powers, in addition to the *reset button* with Russia (defuse the possible causes and reduce the contradictions in the American foreign Policy) and the willingness to define an international order of a binding nature for those countries that will join, a political globalization, that emanates from Washington which goes along side the economic globalization that emanates from Wall Street. This is why he deserved the Nobel Price: the setting is already a fact.

Obviously, obstacles are always around the corner (such possibilities do not seem to be plenty but no one can know, that such a integration process can be transformed into a blockage as occurred in the thirties), however, the upcoming year might sight the presence of a “black Swan” (to use Taleb’s terminology) in matters of domestic policy for China, rather than regionally or globally. India’s framework remains to be far more complex.

Beijing has shown itself highly reactive in addressing the crisis by reversing from day to night its economic policies from Hayek to Keynes, from an economy driven by exports to the attempt to boost domestic consumptions. The result was highly encouraging; to an extent that China will certainly be able to keep growth above 8%, which is the safety threshold to prevent social instability.

Yet many still believe that such promising performance is largely due to the aid package that the government has “lent” to the economy, and thus the momentum created by this action might soon cease. Additionally one more element must be added: for the ongoing crisis to be considered completely over, it is necessary to rebalance the entire international trade system : the American most consume less and save more, the Chinese need to save less and consume more. As Geithner stated: a concept even though tainted with difference national nuances can also works for Europe and other extra – led developing countries. Ugly surprises might very well be around the corner for this long and slow process of re-balance.

Beijing has so far overcome the twentieth anniversary of 1989 and sumptuously celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the People’s Republic but without the people; journalists reported that the population were invited to stay at home and not take part in the celebrations. This could very

India and China

well be a sign that the Party's authorities even when proud of their achievements still continue to fear domestic unrest. The point is a relapse of the international economy cannot be excluded beforehand and if Beijing fails to react with the same energy as in 2009 economic difficulties could ignite protests and inflame political grievances. If this were to occur the authorities might apply an iron fist to contain an eventual unrest and this will consequently compromise the optimistic regional and global framework that has been earlier traced to Beijing.

However, as for India, areas were to run into a “black swan” are more diverse. Globally, if India refuses to join the post-modern order *in fieri* and if it continues to conceive its rise on an interpretation based on purely national interests, it could face a situation of increasing isolation and great frustration and thus give voice to the most nationalist circles of politics.

Regionally if we take into consideration that New Delhi has managed to respond proudly to the aftermath of the November 2008 attacks, what would happen if an attack of that type were to occur again? Similarly if India were to continue to strictly apply the rules and rituals of the Westphalian State, border tensions could arise with China and in particular on what is the real bone of contention between the two countries: Arunachal Pradesh.

Even domestically difficulties are very much present; the shining India of the ITC miracle, which has earned a place in the internal division of labor when it comes to services, seems to have a weaker glow in an ocean of poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and corruption. However, the path the new government has to walk through is difficult and tortuous. After Nehru, Singh is the second Premier to win a historic second term. He de-emphasized the momentum of neoliberal reforms which saw him star in 1991 and trying to adopt an inclusive economic policy, as to alleviate the enormous fractures dividing the country which was summed up with the slogan with which the government has presented the 2004 and 2009 elections: a policy addressed to the “common man”.

India has been only marginally touched by the international economic crisis, perhaps because, beyond rhetoric, its economy is much less globalized than what is perceived. However, the government knows that in order to grow faster and give vent to the potential that the country has to start down the path of reform. Neither can it apply the neo – liberal model, because this crisis has shown its limits, and because an orthodox application of the model would only blow up a situation of wealth polarization that is already impressive and thus setting fire to a social issue that already exists and that probably, apart from the demands of the Naxalites is only held back by the binding force of certain cultural and social factors (think of how strong the caste system is still is).

Economically, the Indian case shows that it is not possible for a developing country, especially with its demographic structure, educational level and the rate of poverty, to skip the stages of modernization: from agricultural subsistence to Bangalore and Bollywood. India still needs, and this is the government's real challenge, of a XIX century revolution: manufacturing facilities and infrastructure.

Perhaps the goal to “keep down the Japanese, keep the Russians away, and the Chinese in Purgatory” (the phrase of Churchill with which he summarized the NATO objectives in Europe), could now be part of history, and this could mean definitely overcoming the obstacles that were surfaced following World War II and thus the end of the Cold War for Asia. The optimistic note which concluded last year's prospective seems to finally materialize. Amongst countless uncertainties, hesitations and sudden chasms, Asia apparently started its process of

India and China

political integration. By transcending ancient divisions, World War II obstacles, the Cold War framework, the great powers of the region, encouraged by Washington, now seem to want to experiment after many years of delay, the path the European Union followed in order to reach integration. One can only auspicate for Asia, by citing Rifkin, to realize the European dream.

Latin America

Economic recovery and political integration

Riccardo Gefer Wondrich

At the end of one of the most difficult years from the point of view of global economy, the main points of reflection regarding Latin America could be the following: a) The macroeconomic policies adopted in recent years have proved apt to face the global crisis effects. b) There is a steady increase in the influence of China and Asia in commercial, financial and investment terms in Latin America. c) The gap between South America -more and more depending upon Asian demand- and Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean -still tied to the United States economy-, is widening. d) Europe is losing appeal and influence in the region. e) The Obama Administration finds it difficult to set out a hemispheric policy clearly different from the one by George W. Bush.

Latin America was not spared by the world economic crisis. The turmoil arrived between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, stopping the process of steady growth that had taken place in the six previous years. In its annual Preliminary Overview of the Economies of the region, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated a 1.8% GDP decrease compared to the preceding year, pushing the average unemployment rate to 8.3%. Commercial activities saw a widespread decrease. The price of basic products went down (-29% in comparison with 2008). Exports decreased by 26% in value. There were fewer investments from abroad (between -35% and -45%), fewer emigrant remittances (-10%) and lower income from tourism (between -5% and -10%). In spite of all this, in comparison with the crisis in the 1980's and late 1990's, this time the blow from outside had a less violent impact on Latin American economies. Since 2003, in fact, the extremely favourable world economic situation had allowed the governments to reduce the debt weight and increase monetary reserves. The measures taken to stimulate internal demand proved largely effective. In fact, with inflation under control and sufficient resources available, the growth trend was resumed in the second semester of 2009. In the crucial moment, the Latin American bank systems proved stable. The public banks balanced the crowding out of the private ones. The central banks could lower the interest rate increasing liquidity in the system. After the initial devaluation at the end of 2008, Latin American currencies continued to re-value over the US dollar. All this contributed to the decrease of the average inflation rate from 8.3% to 4.5%. The debt crisis and the hyper-inflation of the 80's this time did not occur.

The connection of all these elements was well described by Paulo Okamoto, president of SEBRAE, the Brazilian agency supporting micro and small enterprises. During the Italy-Latin America Conference held in Milan on December 2-3, Okamoto suggested the receipt for an economic maintainable growth in the circular connexion among:

Latin America

- a) firmness of financial system;
- b) strength of internal demand;
- c) support of home consumption through incentive government policies;
- d) growth of financial reliability and foreign investments.

This explains the virtuous process that allowed Brazil to get quickly out of the crisis and look at 2010 with optimism and a 5,5% growth expectation (ECLAC figures).

Countries with less stable economies have equally succeeded in starting countercyclical policies, either in the field of public investments to create jobs or in the sector of social assistance. Argentina, with a great plan of infrastructure development, exemplifies the former case, while Bolivia could be an example to illustrate the latter. Here Evo Morales renegotiated a higher price for the gas sold to Brazil utilizing the gain, together with the income from hydrocarbon nationalizations, to create benefits for the old and disadvantaged. As a result, in the elections of December 6 Morales won an overwhelming victory that guarantees him Congress majority, five years as chief of government and the chance to reform the new Constitution in order to run again in 2014.

In brief, most of the governments adopted policies to raise demand and got over the most critical phase characterized by the slowing down of foreign trade and the fall in prices of raw materials and agricultural products.

China and Asia: motor and fuel for expansion

One of the main reasons for the relatively short length of recession in Latin America is the tight relationship with Asian countries. They were the first to get out of the crisis (we could say China did not even enter it) and they represent the heart of future economic development. Chinese exports to Latin America have decupled in the past seven years, reaching \$100 billion in 2008. In a few years they will exceed the value of \$146 billion of the European Union exports. China, India and the other Asian countries are receiving most of Latin American exports. China has ousted the United States as the main commercial partner of Brazil and Chile. Its imports amount to 14.4% of the total Chilean exports, 12.1% of the Peruvian, 9% of the Argentinean, 8.3% of the Brazilian ones.

Chinese direct investments are increasing as well, although they remain clearly lower than those from America and Europe. In 2008 Chinese investments reached \$24 billion, mainly in mining and energy sectors. The way China is working together with multilateral credit organizations is a further sign of its will to become more and more a protagonist on the Latin American scene. In 2008 China entered the Inter-American Development Bank with a subscription of \$350 million. This year Beijing started relations with the *Corporación Andina de Fomento* (head office in Caracas), an important multilateral credit organization specialized in financing large infrastructure works. China Development Bank itself is ever more interested in financing investment plans in Latin America.

A change of historical importance is under way. Latin America has become aware to be facing a great opportunity. The demand from consumers in emerging countries is larger than the US demand. Asia is the main destination of Latin American exports and also a source of direct investments and financing. Up to now, though, strategic links among countries on the two Pacific coasts are not frequent and are mostly limited to the mining sector. Latin America needs to get over the traditional economic concept based on raw materials revenue and labour low cost and start exporting services and manufactured goods with higher added value. This change requires

Latin America

great investments in education and innovation, in addition to a process of reform of state institutions that is only just starting. However, when we talk about the relations between Latin America and Asia and the different impacts of the economic crisis, it is necessary to differentiate various situations within the American continent.

Two Latin Americas

The economic crisis struck Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean countries much harder than it did South America. The figures of 2009 economic trend clearly show this: Mexico suffered a 6.7% decrease, the Caribbean 2.1%, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala between 1% and 3%, while the South American countries displayed an average increase of 0.2%. The geographical division of Latin America into two parts -above and below Panama canal- is now accentuated from the economic point of view. It is also intensified in the political field by Brazilian policies in South America, as we will see further on.

The main signs of the crisis reaching Mexico and Central America are the dramatic fall of tourism and emigrants' remittances, together with the decrease in US investments and imports. Between 2008 and 2009, remittances have fallen by 18% in Colombia, 15% in Mexico, 12.6% in Ecuador and about 10% in Central American countries.

The pattern of light de-localized factories -the *maquila*-, which characterizes Mexican and Central American economies, is facing a crisis. It has become important for these countries to increase competitiveness and innovation, adopting new business models gradually tuning in on Asian markets and production chains. In other words, the diversification of productions and exports must proceed together with an increase of their added value and technological content, in order to attract foreign investments and increase commercial exchanges. In fact, the low level of trade within the region, limited to 17% of the total exchanges, represents one of the weakest points of the Latin American economic system in comparison with the Asian one. The diversification of trade with the Asian countries will open a series of opportunities for reciprocal investments and productive alliances.

Anyway, it is clear that South America is a strategic and complementary partner for the Asian countries thanks to its raw materials, oil and agricultural products. Central and North America on the contrary are more a potential competitor with whom to start productive collaborations.

Latin America: integration or disintegration?

In this macro and micro economic scenery are placed the steps on the road to regional integration. During the last decades the sub-regional Latin American blocks proceeded in the trail of the European experience. In this light the liberalization of infra-block trade through custom unions and free trade areas would come first, and the political integration will follow.

As a matter of fact, the achievements of MERCOSUR, of the Andean Community, of Central American Common Market and of CARICOM have been quite unsatisfactory. Nowadays MERCOSUR and the Andean Community are facing a deep challenge.

Members of the Andean Community as Colombia, Peru and Ecuador are negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union. Within MERCOSUR Uruguay showed its interest in doing likewise with the United States, thus questioning the very existence of the block. Because of the weakness of efficacious super-national institutions the choice to eliminate custom barriers liberalizing exchanges depends on the governments' will. Quarrels periodically break out over the most disputed items -sugar, motor-vehicles, household

Latin America

appliances- among the members of the various blocks that keep on relying mainly upon exports to foreign markets.

In spite of all this, in the last five years new initiatives of regional cooperation have taken place, being commercial integration only one of the objectives. These initiatives are characterized by two main elements. The first is the demand of regional public goods as physical infrastructure, energy, media technologies, environment and also social cohesion. The second is the presence of two charismatic leaders as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil. In fact, it is in Venezuela and Brazil that the two most important plans of this multi-purpose regionalism have started: ALBA, the alliance of pro-Venezuela countries and UNASUR, the political program fostered by Brazil to give homogeneity to the South American continent and take its leadership with an anti-American connotation. In 2009 both these institutions have strengthened, thanks to a political vision generally shared by the Leftist governments holding power in South America. However, although ALBA and UNASUR are useful places for political dialogue, Latin American countries are still far from getting over a “Westfalian” concept of State by decidedly stepping on the road to integration, according to European model. Moreover, the autonomy sphere of each government is increasing and the various international organizations can intervene only ex-post without concrete enforcement chances in a crisis like the one in Honduras.

According to Michael Reid, Latin America editor for *The Economist*, a process of “regional disintegration” is under way, judging from the great number of bilateral quarrels occurred in the last years. National politics is gaining an advantage over the economy’s natural complementarities, in the very moment when the region is facing a great opportunity of growth. To make it possible, though, the expansion on domestic markets ought to be coordinated with regional and inter-continental growth. What really happens is exactly the opposite: with the exception of Brazil, that can count on a huge internal market, the other countries keep on privileging exports without the necessary harmonization of different fiscal, administrative, juridical rules.

Colombia and Venezuela, traditionally integrated in trade, labour and investments, are now damaging bilateral exchanges for political reasons. The old conflicts of Peru with Chile and Bolivia have not come to an end yet. Long time friends as Argentina and Uruguay have been engaged in a quarrel -about cellulose Botnia plant- for years. This conflict should have long been solved without getting to mine diplomatic relations. Ecuador and Colombia have not yet brought their relations back to normal after the Colombian air attack to the FARC camp in Ecuador in March 2008. From the commercial point of view, there have been countless cases of protectionist actions and distortions in the free trade of goods. The situation of continual unrest is reflected by the value of armaments expenses: a total 91% increase over the last four years in Latin America. The continent presents a mixed situation: there are countries wishing to increase the degree of integration with world markets, countries still deep in the process of state reforms and countries that seem more attracted by independent policies.

The UNASUR fits in this articulated scenery. Its political side prevails over the economic one. Indeed it is possible to assert Brazil’s aim to unite all Leftist governments in South America in opposition to the United States and Mexico. At the moment President Uribe in Colombia is the only dissenting voice. January 17 presidential election will tell if also Chile, after two decades of Centre-Left coalition in power, will have a Conservative government. But UNASUR plan takes into little consideration the existing disintegration processes and the fact that for many South American countries the relationship with the United States can hardly be given up. There-

Latin America

fore, instead of a means on integration, UNASUR looks more like the instrument of the area leader's realpolitik.

The hemispheric policy of Obama Administration and the relations with Brazil

One year after taking office, the honeymoon between Barack Obama and Latin American countries seems to be over. The "new era in hemispheric relations" hoped for after the elections has not begun. In the first semester the US Administration only dealt with the most strategic issues: narco-traffic and crime in Mexico, Central America and Colombia. The policy adopted when dealing with Hugo Chávez has been characterized by resort to patience, not yielding to the Venezuelan leader's provocations. With President Lula, on the contrary, Obama has tried to build a wide range collaboration. Yet, for political reasons in Brazil where the government candidate Dilma Rousseff is worried about next elections in October 2010, and for a manifest difference in strategic objectives, the relations between the United States and Brazil have become more complicated.

A number of events have further contributed to widen the gap between the two giants in the American continent: a) The signings of the military agreement between the United States and Colombia, that brought Lula to side with Chávez denouncing "the new expansionist military policy on American part". b) Brazilian strategic collaboration with France in the military and nuclear field. c) The difference of opinions in Washington and Brasilia about the legitimacy of Honduras elections on November 29 last. d) The strong Brazilian support to the petition for eliminating economic sanctions imposed upon Cuba (but suggesting to impose the same sanctions on the new government of Porfirio Lobo in Honduras). e) Last but not least, Lula's support to the Iranian Premier Ahmadinejad and his (civil) nuclear plan. Brazil did not subscribe the condemnation of the Iranian nuclear plan made by AIEA and also dissociated from the strong censure against human rights' violations.

The radicalization of Brazilian foreign policy is one of the elements to be followed with great attention in 2010. In fact, if from the economic side continuity with the four previous governments can be sufficiently guaranteed, from the political point of view a victory of *Partido dos Trabalhadores* without Lula's leadership could reserve surprises.

Conclusions

The world economic crisis certainly found Latin America better prepared in comparison with previous crises. Nevertheless, it caused a substantial cut in international trade, foreign investments and private banks' credits. In the second semester of 2009 the anti-cyclical policies to spur internal demand and the dynamism of Asian markets have allowed to accelerate the recovery process. Anyhow, only in a few years' time it will be possible to go back to the growth rate preceding the crisis, and that will require a change in productive and commercial models and a greater integration with Asian economies. In 2010 ECLAC foresees a 4.3% aggregated growth in the region, slightly higher (4.7%) in South American countries thanks to wider internal markets, to the diversification of export markets and to commercial exchanges with China. Brazil's economic growth is pulling neighbouring Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay as well.

From the political point of view, beyond the rhetoric of integration, there are deep differences among the various governments, with the exception of MERCOSUR and ALBA blocks. In Chile the Conservative candidate Sebastian Piñera, a successful businessman, won the first turn in the Presidential elections. The ballotage, on January 17, might put an end to twenty years' government of Centre-Left *Concertación* (two Christian Democrat and two Socialist govern-

Latin America

ments). José Mujica, the candidate from *Frente Amplio*, was elected in Uruguay. He is a former guerrilla man that has moderated his language and follows the example of Lula's government more than that of Chávez in Venezuela. He can count on the majority in both Parliament chambers. It will be interesting to see how much weight will the labour unions -controlled by the Left- have. The block of pro-Venezuela countries is getting stronger, in spite of the exit of Honduras (led by Manuel Zelaya) from the group. In Bolivia Evo Morales's party, the *Movimiento al Socialismo*, won the elections of December 6 with 63% of the votes and hopes to strike the opposition even harder in next April's administrative elections. Having two thirds of the Senate in his favour, Morales could easily modify the new Constitution by introducing indefinite reelection (as it was done by Chávez in Venezuela last February). The Bolivian relations with the United States remain tense, while the relations with Venezuela, Cuba and Iran are getting better. In Ecuador Rafael Correa was reconfirmed in power for four more years last April. Both in Bolivia and in Ecuador the elections came after a long constituent phase that greatly weakened opposition forces. Honduras seems to be going slowly back to normality. The United States and the European Union have recognized legitimacy to November 29 elections, won by the Conservative candidate Porfirio Lobo. Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic did likewise, while the MERCOSUR governments (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) keep on denouncing the irregularity of elections held during a *de facto* government.

In 2010 the campaigns for the elections in Colombia (in March) and Brazil (in October) will draw a lot of attention. In fact the results of these electoral turns could modify political balances in the region and influence the relations with the United States.

Energy Sector



Oil Rejected, renewable energy and energetic efficiency promoted

Gerardo Iovane

In 2008 traditional oil fuel energy production and alternative energy were the main interests of the international energetic system; at the beginning of 2008 oil passed the 100 dollar-a-barrel mark rising up to 400 dollar-a-barrel mark at the end of the first semester of the same year. In summer 2008 the oil prices begun to decrease progressively sliding finally down to \$40 a barrel at the beginning of 2009. These fluctuations in the production field implied a change, even though less incisive than in the consumption field, which affected the economic instability of that period. The oil prices have fluctuated during the whole 2009 with no regular intervals, but as they had prognosed, the price have never got the 2008 maximum price per barrel. In fact at the end of the last year the oil prices settled at about \$70 per barrel. Anyway the 2008 \$140 oil peak was a great problem for governments who then begun seriously to think about alternative energies, ecocompatibility, the relationship between weather and energy, and energy efficiency. Dubai crack leads us to think that in 2010 the oil prices will rise even though it is not likely we'll have something similar to the 2008 oil peak as the main focus is now on renewable resources and energy efficiency.

Renewable resources¹

Since the first months of 2009 the energy efficiency has played an important role in the international energetic system. As it was predicted in November 2009, the energetic field has been dominated by the energetic efficiency, focusing its interest also on the renewable resources. But at the end of 2009 there was a different kind of interest regarding the energy efficiency, and we give you a resume of that changing situation in the following.

In Lisbon prime minister Jose Socrates and president and chief executive of the Alliance Renault-Nissan Carlos Ghosn have announced that the factory producing last generation lithium ion batteries of the Renault-Nissan alliance would be built in the industrial area of Renault Cacia in Aveiro, 250-km far from the northern part of Lisbon. They've begun to build it and in 2012 it will take up office: it is supposed to have a 50.000-unit production capacity per year. According to the terms of the agreement made with the Portuguese Government, Nissan will invest more than 160 millions euros for the new production area, thus creating 200 jobs directly on that location. Within this programme, the Alliance will furnish its electric cars starting from January 2011. At the same time, the Portuguese government will take care of creating a 1300-

¹ The main bibliographic reference for this article has been looked up at: <http://www.agienergia.it/>.

Energy Sector

recharging station network which will be set throughout the national area in the coming two years. "Being leader in the field of renewable energies, Portugal", Socrates claimed, "aims at being a pioneer in the field of electric mobility, and is actually creating a wide network of recharging station for the electric vehicle batteries. The battery factories of the Renault-Nissan Alliance are a logic consequence of the Portuguese desire to be a place of research, production and experimental solutions and components for the electric vehicles". "We really appreciate the Portuguese government determination and future optimistic perspectives", Ghosn commented, "for what regards the wide range marketing of zero-emissions vehicle".

GE has announced the installation of his own Jenbacher cogenerated technology on the roof of the building where the Deutsche Börse Group offices are located in Eschbom, near Frankfurt. The main goal is to supply one of the main world Stock exchange location with a safe and efficient energetic resource. The installation will be recharged with natural gas, a clean energetic resource, as an alternative to fossil fuels whose use is in line with the environmental programme of the nation. In addition the electricity in excess will be put into the regional electric network, thus incrementing the reliability of the electric system in Frankfurt area. The new productive system, which is supposed to work in Spring 2010, will improve the energetic safety of the operations which paly a vital role to daily support the German economy. "The new cogenerated installation set on the roof of the Deutsche Börse Group building is in line with the ever-growing development of the cogeneration technology for many projects activated all around the world aiming at increasing the local energetic reliability, and reducing polluting emissions", claimed Prady Iyyanki, Ceo of Gas Motors Jenbacher division of Ge Power and Water.

The Italian industry has its own effective role: during the 8th edition of the Research Day, "Investing in technologies for the energetic efficiency: Anie companies commitment in research and innovation", promoted by Anie CBI under the sponsorship of members of the European Committee, emerged that the Italian industry technologies are ready to activate the challenging project about the energy efficiency. Thanks to the operative avant-garde systems already used in the ecosystem marketplace, between 2016 and 2020 Italy could save 12,5 to 17 TWh electricity per year, equal to 25% and 35% respectively of 2005 electric lighting consumption; from 5,6 to 8 Mtep, equal to 15% and 20% respectively of 2005 air-conditioning and Health Service hot water consumption in the civil sector, also applying management and control domotic systems; yearly savings of the industry and infrastructures electric energy ranging from 1,5 and 4 TWh, equal to 4% and 10% respectively of this area electricity consumption in 2005 (i.e. efficient electric motors and rephasing inverters and systems). We have to remember also the important role of the sector of the household electrical appliances, both in the residential and service sector, for which they've prognosed a 5-to-8 TWh electric energy savings till 2020. For these energy reductions an important role could be obviously played by innovation and research, especially for what regards advanced electrical engineer and electronic technologies, aiming at getting a higher energy efficiency, a field where all the companies associated with Anie CBI have got levels of excellence. In 2008 the Italian electrical engineering and electronic industry spent 2,3 billions euros for R&S (equal to 3,8% of the associated bill). Electrical engineering and electronics still offer the main field of research and innovation in the Italian manufacturing marketplace, and they also offer 40% of the possibilities for private investment in R&S. Despite the uneasy economic situation, in 2008 the investment in R&S got a 5,1% rising more than the

Energy Sector

year before. In 2009, despite the current economic crisis, investments in R&S should settle at more than 2 billions euros. "ANIE CBI basic membership acknowledge the value of innovation and research, especially for what regards the advanced technologies for energy efficiency" – Anie CBI president Guidalberto Guidi claimed – "Many of our members have begun to play a fundamental role, and they now get the innovative know-how to offer technologically advanced solutions and products which can be particularly useful to energy". "For quite a long time now, environmental limits" - Guidi added – "have turned into new opportunities and technological challenges for the high-tech companies. Research and innovation have let us realize the financial offer with an eco-friendly approach, thus being affected by new inputs and the new market demands". "Despite the uncertainties implied by our financial crisis which is seriously challenging the Italian company system and has also penalized our most important manufacturing structures" – president Guidi ended – "Anie companies, as testified here, keep on investing in research and innovation".

So the question of energy efficiency needs to be analyzed throughout to actually get medium-and-long period results. Regarding this, it's worth reporting Enea commissioner Giovanni Lelli's speech which opened the conference "Food and energy: a sustainable support", held during the Italian celebrations of the 2009 World Food Day. "Food resources produced by the planet" – Lelli claimed – "are not enough for the needs of the ever-growing number of people in the world, this way accentuating the gap between the rich and the poor. With a world economic crisis and environmental and energetic emergency it is needful to point at concrete and integrated actions in the high-risk areas. Enea, which for more than 50 years has been supporting scientific research activities and technological transfer, can provide technologies, innovative processes, services and training programmes in order to get the most important resources of the developing nations involved and integrated in a multidisciplinary and wide perspective of the sustainability of food industry and natural resources". Hence it is also necessary that the large production of a big amount of food, the one our world really needs, becomes sustainable.

Thus it seems that a line of intervention is so defined that we can predict that in 2010 energy efficiency will be again one of our main subjects of discussion and interests.

Other protagonists of 2009: renewables

2009 has also been the year of renewable energies. All the different divisions, from Aeolian to photovoltaic, have undergone a significant growth. Sure enough photovoltaic has dominated the scene, but in all other divisions there has been a meaningful growth in Italy as like in other Countries.

In the first days of December the Swiss Group EGL AG has signed an agreement to acquire the 24,1% of the German industry Wetfleet Offshore Windenergy GmbH which is developing the project of the 400 MW offshore Aeolian park "Global Tech I" in the Northern Sea.

The park, placed at 100 km from the German coasts, will be constituted by 80 aero-generators with 5 MW power for a total yearly production of 1,6 billion kWh. The overall estimated cost is 1.400 million euro. The building start of the park is planned for 2011, while its start-up is scheduled for 2013. This initiative consolidates the presence of the Group RGL within the field of generation from a renewable source. The German offshore park will support, in fact, the Aeolian system which are going to be realized in Italy and Sweden. In particular in Italy the

Energy Sector

Group, after starting the building of a 66 MW park in the province of Avellino, is planning further investments aimed to diversify its generation portfolio. In the peninsula EGL has already available about 1.800 MW of capacity from modern thermoelectric systems at combined cycle, to which we must add the transport capacity on the Transalpine power line from Switzerland. “After having achieved the prefixed target of capacity with big thermoelectric systems we are now aiming at renewable generation – comments Salvatore Pinto, Managing Director and President of the Italian associate company of EGL – in this field we have identified the Aeolian technology as the priority, but we also look carefully at solar energy. Anyway it will be in Italy that we will mainly concentrate the greatest investments in the near future”.

At the half of December EDF Energies Nouvelles and BEI have signed a ‘memorandum of understanding’ for a 500 million euro funding destined to photovoltaic projects in France and in Italy in the period 2010-2012. These projects, at present in development or building phase, foresee the usage of the so-called thin film photovoltaic technology of the American industry First Solar. “We welcome this innovative solution developed with the funding of BEI and made possible by the volume of our portfolio” has stated Paris Mouratoglou, president of EDF Energies Nouvelles. “This model of funding will allow our industry to accelerate the realization of various projects in France and in Italy and ease the attainment of our ambitious objectives”. “The support of BEI to the projects of EDF Energies Nouvelles – said Philippe de Fontaine Vive, vice-president of BEI – is part of its support to the development of projects for renewable energies and to the contribution in the fight against global warming and energetic independency. We are also convinced that, in order to permit the development and the growth in our Countries, it will be needed the development of R&D and the support to investments for innovative and sustainable projects in all the strategic fields, also in the Energy field to arrest the climatic change”.

What about the present scenario of renewable in Italy?

A research by Insintesi 6Dv and Doxa for AssoIcim on the manufacturer division, whose target is to explore the measures adopted by the industries to reduce the consumptions and the costs of energy but also analyze the driver and the breaks which have determined the business strategies, has shown that 11% of Italian manufacturer industries with more than 50 employees has already installed systems aimed to produce energy from renewable sources, 6% has planned to install them and 61% has considered their adoption. According to this study, between the industries which have installed the systems, the level of satisfaction is really high: 72% in fact declares itself really satisfied. Among the various typologies of renewable energy it emerges the photovoltaic, which has been adopted, installed, planned, evaluated or at least considered by 60% of the whole explored division. From the analysis it emerges, besides, that the industries that have already installed systems to produce renewable energy are: more attentive to energetic costs, bigger, with lower energetic costs, more innovative, more socially responsible, more attentive to communication, have a manager responsible for the energetic management who comes from the technical area. All the industries of this division have at least “taken into account” a solution and 88% has actually made something: 65% has changed its electricity or gas supplier, 49% has improved the efficiency of the production processes, 34% has improved the efficiency of the buildings and 11% has installed a system to produce renewable energy.

There also are specific and peak initiatives in Italy. In fact, “The project of Montalto di Castro (Viterbo) is a milestone for the photovoltaic field, confirming that photovoltaic stations are at

Energy Sector

present financially sustainable and interesting from the commercial point of view,” has stated Howard Wenger, president of Global Business Units of SunPower. “The technology of SunPower is proved and very quickly implementable; our efficiency, as leader of the field, permits us to offer energy at competitive price. We are really pleased with the partnership of SunRay for the generation of clean and reliable solar energy for the community and for the Italian market, which is rapidly expanding”. “In only 240 days, SunRay Renewable Energy has achieved the reduction of carbon dioxide established by the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which has been discussed in this days by the world leaders in Copenaghen,” has continued Amiga. “With the finalization of this phase of the project, the community of Montalto di Castro will be self-sufficient from the energetic point of view. In the next years the photovoltaic station will become the main benchmark in Europe for the production of renewable energy”. The photovoltaic station of Montalto di Castro is the biggest Italian station: the 24 MW structure is, in fact, already active and is supplying clean and renewable solar energy to the electric national network. According to SunRay, the station produces energy sufficient for 13.000 habitations and avoids the emission of 22.000 tons of carbon dioxide per year. The structure, which spreads on a surface of 80 hectares, makes use of 78.720 SunPower solar modules at high efficiency installed on the technology patented by SunPower solar pursuer®. The pursuer orients its motion, during the day, according to the rotation motion of the sun, producing 25% of energy more respect to the fixed inclination systems, reducing significantly the occupied surface. The station of Montalto di Castro is the first phase of a project of development of 85 MW which, according to the forecasts, will become completely operative in 2010.

Alessandro Sotgiu, managing director of Solarday, Italian leader for the production of PV photovoltaic modules, states that Italy runs the risk of losing the train of solar, as the incentives do not suffice: less bureaucracy and more investments in the Italian weaving factory are needed. “A weaving factory finds it hard to take off and an excessive bureaucracy – has said Sotgiu – are at present the main breaks to the development of the photovoltaic field in Italy. The country of the sun runs the risk of being obscured by the bureaucratic slowness and by a chain of value that must still face too many difficulties. Nowadays, to step-up a station 61 passages are needed between network operators and Gse, as well as 20 rules different for 20 regions. It is therefore necessary to adopt straight away clear and simple processes: the legislative uncertainties, at national and regional level, have the effect of discouraging operators and citizens to invest in this field. Other mechanisms are needed, apart from incentives: it is to be hoped the development of the entire weaving factory in order that the energy represents a real opportunity of economic growth for our country. The manufacture of raw material is capital intensive and almost absent in Italy, while the production of components, cells, modules and technologies is well developed but can be at risk due to the strong pressure on the prices and the drop of investments in the production of energy. The installation activity is divided between a myriad of operators which are feeling the effect of the credit crunch and have difficulty to access the credit”. “As Solarday – continues Sotgiu – we will continue our development plans, pointing, above all, towards mature markets like Germany, which at present represents 60% of our production, maintaining the characteristic of Made in Italy product, acknowledged for the high quality and reliability. In Germany, since the first months of 2010, it is expected a reduction of 30% of the incentives but our purchase orders are still significant for the year 2010; to this day 10/12/2009, the orders portfolio is about 12 MW. Considering the actual legislative

Energy Sector

uncertainties we will keep our quota in Italy apart and we will pick the excellent opportunities that the photovoltaic market presents, aiming at new objectives like Greece, France, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Turkey”.

In Italy the future of renewable sources is promising, particularly for the photovoltaic field. This consideration emerges from the study of International Energy Agency (Iea) on the development and the diffusion of renewable energies “Principles for effective policies” presented in December 10th in a convention at the Ministry of Economic Development. The analysis, which compares the policies of incentivization of the renewable energies adopted in the 30 OCSE Countries and in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, taking into account the quinquennial 2000-2005, has highlighted that only a limited number of Countries has, nowadays, implemented effective policies of encouragement towards clean sources. On the basis of these data Italy can foresee a pink future, especially in the photovoltaic field. “Italy – has specified Paolo Frankl, head renewable energy unit of IEA – between 2006 and 2009 has shown sensible signals of pick-up and has a huge potential of development in renewable sources. As well as Aeolian, in fact, the potential is in biomasses and biogas for the co-generation, in solar thermal and in geothermal. Recently there have been improvements, but in order to reach the objectives of 20-20-20 we now need to accelerate”. Frankl has then shown the five principles for efficient policies: remove the non-economic barriers in order to improve the functioning of the market; apply a predictable and transparent support to attract investments; introduce transitory incentives, decreasing in time, in order to promote the technological innovation and to make the sources of renewable energy competitive on the market; consider the effects of penetration at large scale of the renewable sources on the energetic system in its completeness.

It can be predicted that the different renewable sources will keep on increasing also in 2010 in order to improve the energetic mix that the different Countries have planned in their mid- and long-term strategy.

In Italy also nuclear comes back in the energetic mix

On February we had already reconsidered Nuclear. The beginning of 2009, in fact, has been a period of reflection and political action about the opportunity of reinvesting in high energies. The Minister of Economic Development Claudio Scajola has, in fact, pointed out to the government the opportunity of new explorations in the nuclear area.

Nuclear is a really topical theme and characterizes an open discussion between both the experts of the field and the different public consciousness. In February we already stated that nuclear should have been addressed by a greater attention and a significant cultural diffusion in the community. Within the nation, in fact, we still pay the cost of too rapid choices of about 20 years ago that made our industry move back in nuclear field.

The activities have been continuing during the entire 2009, so that in November we have heard that the localization plan of the nuclear stations that are being realized will be presented by the Minister of Economic Development Claudio Scajola within the half of February and will exclude the territories that do not have a vocation to give hospitality to the stations; in fact, this has been reported by the vice Minister Stefano Saglia in the convention about “Energy, City, Environment”, organized by A2A together with the municipality of Milan. The president of Enel, Piero Gnudi, has declared that in Italy there will be space for all the Italian industries

Energy Sector

interested in nuclear, during the convention 'New Energies', organized by the Foundation Marisa Bellisario. In the meantime Carlo Rienzi, the president of Codacons, has invited the government to start a table of discussion about nuclear which must be open to citizens, aimed to evaluate all the projects that will be realized on the territory. This invitation has been expressed at the end of the international convention about nuclear organized by Codacons and held in Rome on November 24th, to which has also participated the President of Senate, Renato Schifani. For these reasons it is clear that also the nuclear theme will play an important role in 2010, at least in the national scenario.

Prospective conclusions

The economic crisis has forced the government all around the world to an attentive reflection about the role of Energy both in economic pick-up and in relation to the climatic changes and energy efficiency. This has allowed to begin a fruitful walk that at mid- and long-term will certainly offer positive results. It must be expected that the trend of growth of attention for renewable energies and energy efficiency will continue for the entire 2010 in the international scenario, in order to reach that energetic mix to which the different governments aim. In Italy also the nuclear field, differently from the past, will give its contribution as the government has shown evident determination in pursuing a mix strategy which does not leave unexplored ways, including nuclear.

International Organizations



The UN action in Somalia: between 2009 and 2010

Valerio Bosco

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1863 opened a new chapter of the international engagement in Somalia. While the group of African crises under review by the UNSC in 2009 represented almost the 70% of its agenda, since the adoption of resolution 1863, the stabilization and pacification process in Somalia has been discussed on a very regular basis – sometimes at the rate of three times per month - at both closed and public meetings of the UN Security Council. Adopted on 16 January 2009, the above-mentioned resolution called upon the UN system and the International Community to step up their efforts in promoting the stabilization in Somalia, and indentified specific conditions for a possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. As it is now almost one year since the adoption of resolution 1864, this article provides a brief overview of the UN support to the stabilization process in Somalia in 2009. The financial, technical and logistical assistance given so far by the UN system to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia is reviewed¹. Possible scenarios for future engagement of the UN system in the country are also considered.

UNPOS, the UN leading actor in Somalia

It might be recalled that the UN engagement in Somalia dated back to 1995 when, after the spectacular failure of the international peacekeeping force led by the US, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established. UNPOS, a political mission under the auspices of the UN Department of Political Affairs, was given the mandate to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia through the facilitation of dialogue between Somali parties. More recently, between 2002 and 2004, UNPOS supported regional and local initiatives for peace and reconciliation in the country. UNPOS's good offices and mediation played a central role in the work of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference and the formation of Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Due to the fragile security situation in Somalia, UNPOS has been evacuated from Mogadishu in 2007 and it is now based in Nairobi, Kenya. Headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmed Ouhd-Abdallah (Mauritania), UNPOS has been instrumental in the signing of the Djibouti peace agreement in 2007 – opening the way for the so called Djibouti process – as well as of the June 2008 cease-fire agreement between the TFG and the Army Re-Liberation of Somalia. Furthermore, the role

¹ Actions taken by the UNSC in dealing with piracy off the coast of Somalia, such as resolutions 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008) and 1897 (adopted on 30 November 2009) are not reviewed in this paper.

International Organizations

of the SRSF in encouraging and diplomatically supporting the withdrawal of Ethiopia from Somalia, a prerequisite of the enlargement process of Djibouti, cannot be overemphasized.

The turning points in December 2008 and the UN strategy on Somalia

The announcement of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops by the end of 2008 raised great concern within the international community. Both the UN Security Council and the African Union noted the risk of a possible security vacuum, which could eventually produce a complete disruption of stabilization process within the country. On 10 and 22 December 2008, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union called upon the UN and the International Community to agree on the creation of an international stabilization force with a view to replacing AMISOM forces deployed in Somalia since 2006². The proposed international force was conceived as a bridging operation for a UN peacekeeping mission aimed at supporting the stabilization of the country in a longer-term. However, on 16 December 2008, the UN Secretary General (SG) announced that only 14 of the 50 countries approached had replied to his request for contribution to a Multinational Force. He noted that “*only one country had offer to provide funding, equipment and logistical support, while a second has offered funding, but no Member State has pledged troops or offered to assume a leading role*”. The SG also confirmed his view that the complex security challenges affecting the situation in Somalia could not be addressed within the capabilities of a typical UN peacekeeping force. According to the SG, a multinational force was “*the right tool for stabilizing Mogadishu*”. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, the growing international concern over a possible disengagement of the African peacekeeping forces deployed by Uganda and Burundi, the lack of consensus (and political will) on a possible deployment of an international force – mainly linked to the memories of the 90’s failures - encouraged the UN Secretariat to elaborate a more articulated strategy of engagement in Somalia. It’s against this background that the note issued by the SG on 17 December indicated the main elements of a new “*Strategic Approach aimed at strengthening the forces of peace in Somalia*”.

In particular, the new approach suggested a) the *strengthening of African Union forces through international support and the possible deployment of UN support package*, including accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armored vehicles, helicopters, vehicle maintenance, Communications, enhancement of key logistic facilities b) *the support to capacity building of Somali security forces through specific in-country and out-country training programs* c) *the possibility of establishing a small multinational maritime force off Mogadishu with possible functions of rapid response at the request of AMISOM* d) *the launch of contingency planning for the deployment of a possible UN peacekeeping operation “at the appropriate time and under right conditions”*³.

² Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, Communiqué on the situation in Somalia, 22 December 2008, PSC/MIN. Comm.4, CLXIII.

³ Letter dated 19 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 19 December 2008, S/2008/804.

International Organizations

UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009) and the UN support package

Despite the considerable pressures made by the U.S delegation at the UN on the members of the Security Council to agree, in the last days of 2008, on the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, the UNSC opted for a more balanced and prudent approach, in line with the view of the SG. In fact, resolution 1863 of 16 January 2009 a) renewed for 6 months the mandate of AMISOM; b) established the creation of a trust fund aimed at promoting international financial assistance to AMISOM and the TFG c) authorized AMISOM to take over the assets belonging to the liquidated United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia-UNMEE d) requested the SG to provide a UN support package, including equipment and services but not involving transfer of funds from the UN regular budget. Moreover, the UNSC expressed “its intention to establish a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia, as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council by 1 June 2009”. This statement of intent, as well as the indication of a specific deadline, raised great expectations from the side of the African membership of the UN and the African Union⁴. The resolution called upon the International Community to strengthen the security forces of the TFG and the ARS, and also requested the SG to proceed with the consolidation of UNPOS through the inclusion of police and military planning expertise in order to support the launch of DDR (Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) processes in Somalia. Furthermore, the Council invited the SG to provide a preliminary report on the implementation of the measures indicated in the resolution 1863 by 15 April 2009. Meanwhile, a Technical Assistance Mission (TAM) organized by the UN Secretariat reviewed the possibilities of supporting the AU forces on the basis of two complementary options a) Provision of capacity logistics support package, to be funded from UN assessed contributions and including equipment and mission support services normally provided for a UN Peacekeeping Operation b) financial support from Member States through the envisaged UN Trust Fund. The UN support package for AMISOM was articulated into different dimensions: stock (fuel, food), engineering (construction, electricity, water supply), medical support, aviation, transport, armored vehicles, communications, IT. The above-mentioned trust fund aimed at financing the costs of the deployment of police and military personnel by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AMISOM (equipment, uniforms, vehicles, armored vehicles, wages). The TAM also highlighted the need to establish a Headquarters of the Department of Field Support (DFS) in Nairobi, as well as a smaller unit in Addis Ababa with liaison duties with the African Union (UN support to AMISOM, UNSOA) with a view to ensuring a prompt mobilization of the UN support package⁵.

Political developments in Somalia and delivery of the UN support package

In early 2009, SRSG's good offices and mediation played a key role in revitalizing the implementation of the Djibouti process. The election of the new President of Somalia Sheikh

⁴ Statements on the Outcome of the follow-up meeting between the African Union, the United Nations, Troop Contributing Countries and International Partners on Somalia, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2009 and 16 February 2009.

⁵ UN Team to explore ways of supporting security in violence-wracked Somalia, UN News Service, 9 January 2009.

International Organizations

Sharif Ahmed and the subsequent appointment of new Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake marked a new beginning for the Somali reconciliation process. The government formed on 20 February 2009 included, among its 36 members, elements of the TFG and ARS, as well as representatives from the civil society and the Diaspora. President Sharif Ahmed further tried to broaden the social and political support for the new course by announcing the adoption of a moderate version of the Sharia with a view to enlarging the Djibouti process to those elements belonging to the malleable wings of the Islamist network. Despite these positive developments, both the AU and AMISOM Force Commander expressed deep concern over the divisions on the presence of AU troops within the Somali government, and the increasing intrusion of the foreign fighters in Somalia.

At the end of March 2009, while AMISOM was about to reach the amount of 4350 deployed troops, 54% of its authorized strength (8000 troops), the UN General Assembly started its discussion on the UN support package. On 7 April, the GA approved the first phase of the support package for a total 71.6 million dollars. Furthermore, the UN Department for Field Support (DFS) indicated specific areas of deployment of the first portion of the package. According to DFS the package should focus first on the strengthening of security at Mogadishu, the establishment of the Force Headquarters for AMISOM, the provision of medical facilities, as well as tactical and strategic communications capabilities. In particular, the establishment of AMISOM Headquarters and an efficient hospital in Mogadishu were seen as crucial steps to be taken in order to ensure the expansion of the AU force “*from a military mission to an integrated civilian, police and military one*”⁶. In April 2009, from the logistic base in Brindisi, through Entebbe, the UN Secretariat sent to Mogadishu defense field stores, medical supplies, a mobile airfield lighting systems, airfield firefighting, and communication related equipments. In early May, the transfer of the assets of the liquidated United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to AMISOM was completed. Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) intensified its support for AMISOM on military and police planning, and assisted the AU in updating the military and police concepts. DPKO also assisted the AU in preparing the budget of AMISOM and the detailed estimate of required equipments with a view to presenting a consolidated assessment of its needs at the donors’ Conference, sponsored by the United Nations, and expected to take place in Brussels. The UN system also increased its support to the creation and development of the Somali security forces and national police. In partnership with AMISOM, UNPOS and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) promoted the strengthening of the Joint Security Committee, the Joint Security Force and assisted the Somali police, the three security institutions created by the process of Djibouti. Several training programs for the Somali police were carried out with a view to training 4,000 police officers.

15 April SG’s report and the Brussels Conference

In line with resolution 1863, the SG issued his 15 April report, which provided a more detailed assessment of the contingency plan for a possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, and indicated other possible options and scenarios for UN engagement in Somalia, in the event that the UNSC decided to not to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 20 July 2009, S/2009/373.

International Organizations

Option A indicated the transition from AMISOM to a UN peacekeeping operation. As suggested by DPKO planners a UN force for the pacification of Somalia should include 22,500 troops - five brigades - deployed in Southern and Central Somalia, and supported by maritime and aviation components. According to the SG, the mission needed to include a substantial police component of approximately 1.500 police officers and 8 formed police units, as well as a civilian component. This structure aimed at allowing the envisaged force to perform functions and typical tasks of a “multidimensional peacekeeping operation”. However, *Option A* was considered to be a high-risk one, and likely to mobilize against the United Nations all the Somali factions traditionally opposed to an international military presence in the country. Due to the deep skepticism existing within the UNSC over the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, the report suggested three additional options for possible UN engagement in the country. In particular, *Option B*, summarized in the formula “*staying the course: strengthening AMISOM while building Somali Security Institutions*” called upon the UNSC to promote an increasing engagement of the UN system - UNPOS and UNDP in particular - in supporting the strengthening of Somali security forces and AMISOM, and assisting the AU in the generation of additional troops allowing the mission to reach its authorized strength of 8000 peacekeepers. However, the report recognized that the above-mentioned option, without an anchored presence on the ground, especially in Mogadishu, and with only limited visits, relied heavily on engagement with Somalis from outside the country. Considering the limits of option B, the report therefore noted the feasibility of its evolution towards a third scenario - *Option C* - involving the creation of a light-footprint of the UN in Mogadishu. This option included the re-localization of elements of UNPOS, the newly-born United Nations Support for AMISOM Office (UNSOA), and the UN country team in Mogadishu. However, it was highlighted that improved security conditions were crucial in order to allow an increased UN presence in the country. According to the SG, the UN presence should develop as a gradual approach, beginning with more regular visits by UN staff to Mogadishu, following by the development of a security concept for a small permanent UN presence, composed by an integrated office gathering UNPOS and UNSO, and to be realized within the AMISOM Headquarters. Finally, the report also mentioned a “worst-case scenario” - Option D - as a possible result of a dramatic deterioration in the security conditions and the withdrawal of AMISOM. The inclusion of such an option in an official UN document, indicating the possible withdrawal of AMISOM, raised harsh criticism from the AU, which expressed deep concern over the fact that the UN assessment on a possible worst-case scenario could undermine the authority and legitimacy of the African peacekeepers and further encourage terrorist acts against the troops of Burundi and Uganda deployed in Mogadishu. Another important feature of the UN engagement in Somalia during the first months of 2009 was the preparation of the Donors’ Conference for Somalia, which took place on 22 April in Brussels. As requested by UNSC Resolution 1863, the UN SG coordinated the convening of the above-mentioned international conference aimed at supporting of the Somali security and police forces, as well as the AU Mission in Somalia. Hosted by the European Union, the Conference included participants from over 60 countries. Donors pledged an amount in excess of \$213 million, in addition to pledges that were made in kind.

International Organizations

Resolution 1872 and the developments of the summer 2009

In early May, the UNSC firmly reacted against a new wave of terrorist attacks against the Somali government. While the SRSG referred to the 13 May attacks as an attempted coup⁷ – whose objective was to overthrow the government of Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake – the UNSC issued a presidential statement strongly condemning the renewed offensive against the TFG⁸. A few days later, on 26 May, the UNSC unanimously adopted a new resolution condemning the terrorist attacks, and calling upon Member States and regional organizations to generously and timely contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM and the Somali security forces. Whilst encouraging the SG to continue to offer UN support to AMISOM through the support package – *but excluding the transfer of funds from the UN regular budget, an option considered by several UN Member States as being against the principles of the UN Charter* – the UNSC also reaffirmed its statement of intent regarding the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, and authorized the AU force to continue its mission in Somalia until 31 January 2010⁹. *Pending the achievement of sensible improvements in the security situation, the resolution authorized the SG to implement the incremental approach and accelerate the deployment of elements of UNPOS and UNSO in Mogadishu. It might be recalled that the entire international community seemed to agree on the possibility of an increased international presence in Somalia. In fact, the International Contact Group for Somalia, held in Rome on 9-10 June 2009 under the auspices of the SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, called upon the UN and international community to open their offices in the country “as soon as possible” and recognized the importance of the Italian decision to reopen its embassy in Mogadishu¹⁰.* Nevertheless, the 9-10 June ICG meeting revealed the huge delay in the mobilization of funds pledged at the Brussels Conference. *At the date of 15 June 2009, the Trust Fund for AMISOM collected only \$15 million. Furthermore, only \$66 of the \$213 million announced in Brussels were disbursed. In particular, while only \$28.65 million of the \$145 millions promised for AMISOM were disbursed, the TFG received only \$30 millions of the 48.27 announced in support of the strengthening of the Somali security forces.* Nevertheless, the political process in Somalia seemed to move forward. Some days after the Rome ICG, the TFG announced the signing of a joint declaration with Ahly Sunnah Wal Jam'a (ASWJ) on cooperation on humanitarian, political and security issues. In reporting to the UNSC the widening of the political base of the TFG, the SRSG strongly raised the issue of the “physical presence” of the International Community in Somalia. In relation to the work carried out by UNPOS, Mr. Ould-Abdallah noted that *the UN temporary presence in Nairobi had lasted far too long and recalled that the United Nations could effectively work with Somalis for peace and reconciliation and address pressing humanitarian needs if they were close to the victims of violence and different abuses. According to Mr. Ould- Abdallah, the creation of a “Green Zone” along the lines of*

⁷ SRSG accuses Somali fighters of launching an attempted coup, Nairobi, 13 May 2009, www.somalia.org.

⁸ UN Department of Public Information, Security Council condemns resurgence of fighting in beleaguered Somalia, demands that opposition groups immediately put down arms, join reconciliation efforts, 15 May 2009.

⁹ UN Department of Public Information, Security Council condemns renewed Fighting in Somalia, authorizes African Union Peacekeeping Force to maintain mandate until 31 January 2010, 26 May 2010.

¹⁰ Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, The World's Duty to Somalia, in The Washington Post, Monday 20 July 2009.

International Organizations

those created in other crisis situations, could facilitate the re-localization in Mogadishu of the UN agencies and offices dealing with the crisis in Somalia. Furthermore, the UN SRSG convened in Washington D.C. , with the support of the United States, a major event aimed at increasing the involvement of the Somali Diaspora in the stabilization of the country. The Conference, which took place from 1 to 5 August 2009, gathered Former Senior Somali Military and Police Officers, and formulated concrete recommendations on a possible national security architecture, the establishment of an effective Somali police and the launch of DDR programs.

The incremental approach and the Somali political process in the second half of 2009

During the second half of 2009, in line with UNSC resolutions 1863 and 1872, the United Nations started implementing the above-mentioned incremental approach. Despite adverse security conditions, it was possible to establish a cycle of missions to Mogadishu in order to facilitate interaction and cooperation with the TFG and AMISOM. After major fighting subsided in July, international UN Staff, including Senior UN Officials, resumed mission into Mogadishu at the rate of two per week on average in July and August. The attacks of 17 September 2009 to AMISOM – which killed 20 soldiers of the AU peacekeeping mission - compelled UN to review the security measures of the missions to Mogadishu. Nevertheless, in late summer 2009, the UN staff in Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland, amounted to 700 Somalis and 80 international officials. As indicated by the UN Secretariat, the ongoing implementation of the incremental approach still required additional improvements in the security situation in the Somali capital. For instance, it was recalled that according to the UN security policies, Mogadishu was still identified as being in phase V – “evacuation” - which continued to prevent the UN international staff from moving back into Mogadishu. Under existing UN security policies, permanent regular assignment of UN international staff to Mogadishu required downgrading the security phase from level V to level IV, “emergency”. This downgrading clearly depends on significant improvement in the security conditions. Nevertheless, the creation of offices, medical facilities , secure housing and accommodations can still be considered as crucial. In line with the request made by the UNSC in resolution 1872, the SRSG continued his work with the international community to support reconciliation in Somalia, and also facilitated the dialogue between the TFG and the group ASWJ. UNPOS suggested measures aimed at implementing the joint statement signed by the TFG and ASWJ and agreed to organize a capacity-building workshop to help ASWJ strengthen security and judicial institutions in its areas of control. UNPOS was also very actively engaged in promoting governance and capacity building for the TFG. In support of the constitution-drafting process, the UN system dealing with Somalia provided advice to the TFG on good practices derived from lesson learned from Somalia’s constitutional history and political context. The UN designed and coordinated a senior managers’ introduction course for the new formed Ministry of Constitution and Federal Affairs in Nairobi. Capacity building also remained a key priority in moving the Djibouti process forward. UNDP and UNPOS refocused their training programs and capacity building initiatives with a view to targeting the priority ministries identified by the Prime Minister: Ministries of Interior, Defense, National Security Planning, Reconstruction, Finance, Information. Concerning the UN support to AMISOM, following the approval by the UN General Assembly of \$139 million for financing the AU peacekeeping mission for the

International Organizations

period from 30 June to 31 December 2009¹¹, the UN launched the delivery of the second portion of the support package. With additional funds, the UN assisted the AU in establishing a secure communication network linking AMISOM Force Headquarters in Mogadishu with AMISOM mission Headquarters in Nairobi. In September 2009, UNSOA delivered key strategic equipments valued at 4 million dollars to AMISOM in Mogadishu, finalized the deployment of a system of radio communication between Mogadishu and Nairobi and also carried out several multidisciplinary training for more than 300 troops of Burundi and Uganda. In line with Resolution 1872, the United Nations continued to provide planning and operational support to the AU in respect of the deployment and operations of AMISOM. The UN planning team assisted the AU strategic planning and management unit in preparing for the deployment of additional battalions from Uganda and Burundi and liaising with AU Troop Contributing Countries to facilitate additional contributions. The UN also assisted the review process of the rules of engagement for AMISOM in order to allow a more robust enforcement action against fundamentalist groups hostile to the TFG. It might be recalled that the UN planners also worked on the creation of an AU media strategy designed to counter the propaganda against AMISOM carried out by the Islamist groups. *Despite all these efforts, in late November 2009, 5280 troops, more than 65% of AMISOM's authorized strength, were actually deployed in Mogadishu. The possible deployment of two additional battalions from Uganda and Burundi and the Djibouti's offer to provide AMISOM with 400 special forces unit could allow the AU mission to reach its authorized strength. However, a recent meeting of the AU, TCCs to AMISOM, the UN, and International Partners highlighted the need to re-focus the current international and national efforts in dealing with deteriorating security situation in Somalia. The meeting noted the continued inability of AMISOM to reach its authorized strength, and urged the UN and the International Community to give further impetus to the recruitment and training programme of Somali Security Forces in order to enable Somali institutions to cope effectively with security situation in the country*¹².

The way forward

The UNSG is expected to issue his new report on the situation in Somalia by the end of 2009. The report should provide a comprehensive update on the status of contributions from the Brussels pledging Conference and also assess the degree of implementation of the UN Support package to AMISOM. The possible outcome of the International Contact Group on Somalia, scheduled to take place on 17 December in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - where the TFG is supposed to present, for the very first time, a comprehensive set of strategies aimed at addressing security, reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction issues - might inform the SG's report, which could eventually re-focus the UN strategy on Somalia on the strengthening and streamlining the UN support to the Somali Political and Security Institutions. The report will be discussed in January 2010 by the UN Security Council. Despite the pressures carried out by the AU Member States at the UN, the UNSC is not expected to agree on the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and will probably re-launch the implementation of the above-

¹¹ UN Department of Public Information, Fifth Committee takes up Financing to continue logistical support package for African Union Mission in Somalia, 5 June 2009.

¹² Statement of the Follow-up Meeting of the African Union, TCCs to AMISOM, and International Partners on Somalia, Addis Ababa, 14 December 2009.

International Organizations

mentioned incremental approach. However, as requested by the AU and AMISOM Force Commander, the UNSC might consider possible SG's proposals on the provision of a small maritime and air defense capabilities to the AU mission. This could allow AMISOM to strengthen its profile, currently identified in a traditional peacekeeping mission, which does not match with the daily counter-insurgency activities that it is being asked to perform without having the required expertise and capab

International Organizations



Negative balance for Russia in Central Asia

Lorena Di Placido

In Quarterly Winter 2008-2009, the author of this article proposed energy and security as the driver of regional cooperation in Central Asia for the year 2009, whose findings were the clearest contrasts in the energy field between Turkmenistan and Gazprom and the Conference on Afghanistan organized by the SCO. The combination of further tension along the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the worsening of the hydro-energy crisis and the gradual consolidation of China as a preferred partner for Central Asian Republics have increasingly drawn a context in which Russia plays with increasing difficulty the usual role of mediator primus inter pares. Its action seems still adhering to the regional context only when using tools of international cooperation and innovative moves away from the traditional Soviet model of relations with the Republics of former USSR.

Conference on Afghanistan

On 27 March 2009 was held in Moscow an ad hoc conference on the Afghan crisis organized by SCO. This event had been announced several times and great was the expectation, as it was perceived as a significant regional involvement of neighbouring countries surrounding Afghanistan and potentially capable of producing tangible results. The reality has profoundly reduced these initial expectations and 2009 was not "the year of Afghanistan", as it was not 2008, during which the crisis in the Caucasus diverted elsewhere the political attention of the SCO members. The reasons that led to the substantial failure of the conference are attributable primarily to two factors: the inability to translate mere statements of principle into concrete action-oriented to the solution of certain aspects of the crisis, in coordination with what already is operating by the international coalition active in Afghanistan; the total otherness of the Moscow conference compared to the initiative organized by the United Nations and NATO in The Hague, which took place just three days away. Those who in Moscow were invited as observers - United Nations, NATO, OSCE, G8 - in The Hague acted as players, even Iran, another important regional actor for the achievement of any substantive result.

Thanking the Russian presidency, SCO is credited with having expressed a different approach to enhancing regional actors neighboring Afghanistan and directly threatened by what flows from it. However, the failure to give such a voice with extra-regional actors already active in the country, has not led to any tangible results.

Moreover, at the Moscow conference the issue of Afghan-Pakistani crisis has been addressed in terms of regional consequences and was not formulated any possible solution to the crisis itself.

International Organizations

Neither the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, celebrated on June 16, only 3 months away, has produced anything but other conventions on combating terrorism and the exchange of information. A direct appeal to the crisis was given by the trilateral meeting of Medvedev, Karzai and Zardari, who have signed an agreement for the exchange of information aimed at the containment of terrorist movements active in the Afghan-Pakistani border area because of the fear that they may actually contaminate the entire region .

It clearly follows as been considered an urgent priority to stem the threat posed by trafficking and illegal and subversive activities from Afghanistan, but how to normalize the situation inside the country was not discussed at all within the SCO.

In spite of the availability of the SCO to start a constructive dialogue with NATO (as stated on several occasions by the Secretary-General Nurgaliev), the fact remains that both organizations, while recognizing the importance of security in Central Asian space, in fact propose independent of each other plans leading to possible actions for stabilization. The impression that emerges is that for the SCO accreditation as a regional mediator remains a top priority rather than abandon crucial positions of suspicion and mistrust, pursuing a common and shared strategy with NATO, leading to the result of regional stabilization. Therefore, the organization of the conference in Moscow appears to have been a complex event to achieve a better international image, rather than an initiative built to produce concrete action, in coordination with the forces already active in the solution of the Afghan crisis. For SCO the risk of failure would be too high and unbearable as the organization is regularly engaged only in secure areas of cooperation, moreover after having harshly criticized the inconclusiveness of ISAF engagement.

A loser 2009 for Moscow

In 2009 several unresolved matters inherited by Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union arrived to a breaking-point: those that could be considered at an early stage as benefits – such as traditional political relations, leadership trained in Moscow, infrastructure oriented towards Russian territory - on which for more than a decade Moscow has adjusted its foreign policy in the sign of continuity, are gradually being eroded, since domestic policies of Central Asian Republics became more and more "nationalist" and able to manage relationships with independent various regional and extra-regional actors. Emblematic in this regard was the interruption of gas supplies from Turkmenistan from April to the end of December 2009. Claiming that the global financial crisis had reduced the scope for trade both in quantities and agreed prices, Russia unilaterally reduced the "European price" of 300 \$ / tcm per year that since the beginning of 2009 it should have been paid for the gas bought by Gazprom from Turkmenistan. To further aggravate the situation between 8 and 9 April explosions occurred at a pipeline run by Gazprom on Turkmen soil. The incidents aroused the irritation of Turkmen leaders, who accused the Russian company for negligence, demanding adequate compensation (not yet obtained) for the suffered damages. The charge of Ashgabat is that Gazprom has unilaterally decided to reduce the volume of transported gas, causing a dangerous change in gas pressure, a charge which Moscow has countered saying that the explosion was instead caused by negligence of Turkmen counterpart.

However it happened, it seems that in Turkmenistan the parable of Gazprom as sole gas importer-monopolist came to an end. Already on April 16 it was signed in Ashgabat an agreement between the Turkmen State Agency for the management and use of hydrocarbons (directly dependent from the Office of the President) and the German energy giant RWE (Rheinisch-

International Organizations

Westfälische Elektrizitätswerk). In a statement of 30 November 2009, the general manager of RWE, Oppermann Heiko, has announced that the first phase of sounding and preliminary tests is already concluded and that his company started exploring the "block 23" in the southeastern region of the Caspian Sea, in Turkmen waters. Moreover, in October RWE opened an office in Ashgabat.

The entrance of the first great Western partner into the Turkmen energy market has sanctioned the launch of a real multi-vector national policy, abandoning traditional privileged relationship with Gazprom, which is further weakened by the new pipeline connecting Turkmenistan and China. On December 14 it became operative a pipeline of over 7,000 km which, when fully implemented in 2012, will supply China with 40 bcm of Turkmen gas per year, entering through Xingiang, Uzbek and Kazakh territories and reaching to the shores of the Pacific. China thus became the second largest importer of Turkmen gas after Russia.

According to official Turkmen sources, the realization of this grandiose project (launched in 2007 by the late President Nyazov) is only the most obvious sign of a more robust and structured bilateral link, which also consists of the presence of 35 Chinese companies operating in Turkmenistan with 53 projects in energy, telecommunications, agriculture, textiles, food production, health fields for an amount of one billion dollars in total investment.

On December 12, Chinese President Hu had traveled to Kazakhstan for the inauguration of a symbolic piece of Turkmen-Chinese pipeline passing over the territory in 2011 and to which a section from the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan will supply gas to China for a total of 10 bcm per year, while another branch will be connected from Uzbekistan.

The partnership with Beijing provides Kazakhstan also the granting of a loan of 10 billion dollars and financial support for the gas State company MangistauMunaiGas.

The crisis in the former Soviet energy grid

Another tragic aspect of the inability of Moscow to successfully manage the Soviet legacy comes from the severe crisis in the energy distribution network still operating in Central Asian Republics. As long USSR existed, among its components it had been implemented a complex system of interdependence whereby energy resources were provided to the Republics which had not, introducing from their side a virtuous circle of compensation mechanisms. Thus, in Central Asia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan provided energy to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which, in turn, enter their abundant water resources in the circuit offsets. Without the Soviet Union, newly independent Republics have given to national companies the exploitation of their energy resources, demanding the payment of a price for the provision that once was the case for free. But while gas and electricity must be paid, water continued to be provided for agriculture of the countries downstream from the two poorest states of the region without any payment. When Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started projects to build dams and hydroelectric plants, the precarious balance inherited from the Soviet period has increasingly deteriorated. In particular, Uzbekistan does not accept that Tajikistan use for internal purposes the water it needs for the cultivation of cotton, of which it is second world largest producer. Already during the past years Uzbekistan expressed his opposition by interrupting the supply of gas and electricity to disadvantaged Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also, when they had to face severe winters. The situation has further deteriorated when Tashkent unilaterally decided to break away from the Central Asian energy distribution network on December the first 2009, since Uzbekistan chose to focus

International Organizations

on national production of electricity, already successfully exported in Afghanistan. That decision led to the isolation of Tajikistan, which can no longer receive electricity from Turkmenistan (which separated from the energy network in 2003). Moreover, its ambitious project to complete the construction of Roghun hydroelectric power station (in addition to Songtuda 1 and 2, respectively, supported by Russia and Iran, of which only the latter is already working) is still far from to be fulfilled. According to the Tajik authorities Roghun facility should solve all the national energy problems, also creating conditions for export to China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well to concentrate water resources for better use in warm periods. The lack of liquidity for a country like Tajikistan that has a GDP per capita of \$ 1800 per year and counts as the first item of national income remittances from migrants has prompted the Dushanbe authorities to ask workers to subsidize the project by donating one month of their salary, on average about \$ 80.

For its part, Kyrgyzstan has sought to overcome its shortage of supply by entering into an agreement with Kazakhstan for the purchase of coal in exchange for small amounts of electricity and economic benefits.

Conclusions

The year 2009 closes in net loss for Russia, plagued by a steep fall in GDP and the inability to hoard the substantial revenues of the energy industry, reinvesting and improving the national economy. In this complex situation and detrimental to the international dimension of the country are associated difficulties arising in the Eurasian space, motivated by controversial legacies of the Soviet period, at first glance still functional in the immediate post-Soviet period to maintain their traditional links with the newly independent Central Asian Republics, but troubled in the last years.

The failure of mediation in Afghanistan, the need to react to the American presence in the region, the inability to play a significant role in the balance among states independent since the end of the post-Soviet era, in the absence of harmonious cooperation aimed at a comprehensive development of the Central Asian area, determine a balance of the presence in Central Asia where Russia comes from heavily weakened. In this context, the realization of the Turkmen-Chinese pipeline shows that with the right partner and proper funding post Soviet countries can emancipate themselves and build alternative pipelines not controlled by Moscow. The Turkmen-Chinese pipeline is an example of real benefit to both Central Asians -who see renewed their network infrastructure and significantly oriented their new energy routes- and China - which has seen a further consolidation of the position of overall advantage in the region, as natural gas gets much more secure and favourable conditions than those of current imports of liquefied gas through pirate-infested shipping lanes. In all this, the only loser is Russia, which is too tied to the assets of the initial post-Soviet independence and lacks a national strategy renewed and tailored on the current Central Asian framework. Only in the cooperation established through SCO, Russia takes into account the changing regional environment following the establishment of independent republics, rather than federated Soviet Union, and the entry of new regional actors in Central Asian space, first of all China. Russia should therefore start a deep reflection on the necessity of overcoming the loser Soviet style pattern of cooperation with Central Asian countries, in favour of the most promising post Soviet pattern achieved within SCO. In the long run, it could prove beneficial even for the Central Asian Republics, which could gain

International Organizations

from counterbalancing Chinese presence by other important partnerships, included a renewed one with Russia. Excessive reliance on Beijing could, in fact, flattening their foreign policy positions of severe disadvantage if the forms adopted for the "cooperation" in Central Asia will assume the characteristics of the economic colonialism practiced in Africa by China. In the Central Asian context, during 2010, the activities of Kazakhstan will be closely monitored, as it has been consolidating as a regional leader, emerging with increasing evidence from post-Soviet era. The assumption of the presidency of the OSCE is an important opportunity to consolidate internationally a growing role. Even in spite of the criticism on the uncertain state of democracy in the country, the low respect for human rights and not always protected individual liberties, it is recognized that the Nazarbaev country achieved a pivotal role in the post-Soviet Central Asian region.

Focus On

The importance of small and developing countries in solving crises in the International Community

Slobodan Simic

The nature of international conflicts triggered by instabilities can be seen from different angles, and a theoretical approach, analysis and explanation can to a great extent provide some joint determiners for conflict situations in general, primarily for the purpose of overcoming them. The core nature of conflict situations in the world is consequentially linked to instabilities that are most visible through economics, politics the formation of a new geopolitical identity of the international community, dependence on natural energy resources, international law, security and other factors, not disregarding the historical, geographical, religious, sociological and other aspects.

The comprehension of the origin, but later on the overcoming of conflict situations as well, has its greatest reflection in the sphere of economics. The imbalance in the development of the highly developed and small and developing countries, poverty of a great number of people and unemployment are just some of the characteristics that either on its own or in interaction with others generate conflict situations. Disproportional overflow of capital, as well as the applications of different economic pressures on states and societies give a special reflection in which stated equalities at the world level do not have stable grounds. Regardless of the way the economics is the cause of the emergence of certain conflicts, it will, after all, be the guideline that can, under favourable or unfavourable conditions, bring us to the prevention or emergence out of the conflict situation.

A political connotation appears only as an add-on to the economic viewpoint, where we can through the political-institutional apparatus permanently stimulate or mitigate conflict situations. The international aspect, as it proved itself, can be an adequate means in preventing a crisis if it adheres to the international conventions. However, it can show itself as a means of enforcement that can generate the conflict.

Global instability and state of crises display a multi-faceted influence on small and developing countries. International relations and international order after the loss of the balance of power between the great powers are still not sufficiently rooted and adequately respected, so they can represent a guarantee of stability of international relations, providing at the same time the satisfaction of the international actors with the existing system.

A system undefined like this, the history has shown, has always brought to conflicts on a greater scale, in which small and developing countries have become even poorer.

Focus On

Economic wise, small and developing countries fall behind the highly developed ones. It is difficult to catch up with these countries in a shorter time period¹. These countries, geographically, gravitate towards 'unstable areas' in the world: Middle East, the southern part of the Caucasus mountain chain, Central Africa, Central Asia, Southwest Asia, parts of Middle and South America. This puts them, both implicitly and explicitly into risk groups of crises generators or dependant actors in a state of crisis. The viewpoint of security and defence in this contextual plane has probably the greatest influence due to the fact that significant means are spent for this purpose, even though these countries have modest budgets. The situation is even more difficult if an international actor identified in this way does not have prominent allies, is not in one of the alliances or unions as a member, or does not have any strategic resources.

It is more than clear that a state identity in international relations is represented by its value in the redistribution of its overall regional or world capabilities in one of the plans of socio-economic and political development. Small and developing countries are, primarily due to their economic means, not capable of following the highly developed countries in this way. Because of this, their entire internal and external policy is adapted firstly to the demands of the organisation for which they are acceptable or from which side they have more interests, and only then to its own potential, developed mostly at the local level.

However, in today's constellation of relations, under different influences there are situations when both small and developing countries gain on their importance, either through a short episodic role or by giving them importance during a longer period of time. This is particularly emphasised during crisis situations when the entire geographical position or a part of the territory of a small and developing country has an utmost importance in achieving aims of a union of states, countries of a region or the global solution of a problem, regardless whether it is a national, state or religious issue.

The fate of small and developing countries is seen in the fact that their influence and importance in the international relations gets stronger the more they are adjusted to their dominant processes. This does not mean an unquestionable acceptance of everything that comes out of those processes and relations, but it does mean, both explicitly and implicitly, a positive participation in them. An optimal adjustment to these processes makes it possible for small and developing countries to become more of an actor than an object of the international relations, taking into account the objective limitations these countries have².

The pivotal point of the decision when a small and developing country takes one or the other side is the issue of the survival of its geo-political identity and marking the road of its future. In the real life the question of an alliance is also the question of securing its own interests, either directly or indirectly, what gives a reflection of importance at a given point in time, even

¹ The wealth of the three richest men in the world is bigger than the GDP (taken together) of the 26 poorest countries of the world.. Milasinovic R.; Possibilities of conflict prevention, Collection of works of the Faculty for civilian defence, Belgrade, 2002, pg. 47.

² As an example we can offer Luxembourg which is much smaller than the Balkan countries or Kamerun, Gabon, Turkmenistan, but the sole fact that it is an equal member of the European Union gives that country a possibility to be an actor in the international relations. During the times when it takes over its six-month mandate of presidency over the European Union this country has a chance to, at least to some extent, influence the direction of its policy. As another example we can offer Slovenia that has already once been a non-permanent member of the Security Council, which gave it a chance to be an actor of the international relations.

Focus On

though small and developing countries serve primarily as an object in the redistribution of the spheres of interest of the great powers.

In order to protect their own interests and to try to eliminate crisis states, small and developing countries apply different methods in order to compensate for their deficiencies and 'vulnerability' or their own elements of statehood. The most characteristic ones are:

- alliance with bigger and better developed countries,
- trade-offs,
- the role of inter-zone in conflict situations,
- the role of an actor during a crisis state.

The alliance of small and developing countries with bigger and better developed ones does not mean only a sum of the activities that are conducted at a multilateral level, but also has an augmented effect on them. Sometimes the accession of a small and developing country to an alliance can affect the balance of power in the redistribution of interests, which automatically puts the small and developing country either on one or the other side. Giving the approval to states for entering a coalition can also bring about an internal conflict in the coalition, which complicates both the stance and development of policy towards an interesting issue³. In these sometimes secretive political activities small and developing countries can gain, but also lose a lot. While in the case of the great powers, an alliance adds to their political might, for small and developing countries gives an opportunity to accomplish much greater interests than they could if they were not the members of the alliance.

The method of compensation can be used by small and developing countries when great powers ask them for certain favours (a part of the territory in order to establish military bases, participation in blocking the borders of a neighbouring country that pressure is being applied on, etc.). By making these 'favours' small and developing countries can gain certain privileges: sale of their products at certain markets, lowering of the import rates for certain products from the market, education of personnel in certain segments, political lobbying in order to accomplish certain goals for small and developing countries, infiltration of fresh capital and investments into the economy, etc.

Small and developing countries are often an inter-zone between the alliances, belligerent countries or belligerents in general, spheres of interests, even economically dependent international actors. Luxembourg came into existence as such a country, in order to separate France and Germany from each other. Afghanistan was created as a buffer zone between Russia and India, which, as a colonial and later on a neo-colonial country, has been under a significant influence of the United Kingdom. Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of the fact that it was a member of the 'Non-aligned Movement', was also a buffer zone between the West and East block at the Balkan Peninsula.

³ For example, the issue of the Gulf of Piran in 'Krsko' nuclear power station have always been contentious issues between Slovenia and Croatia. Increased aspirations of Slovenia for solving the border dispute, as well as redistribution of the production of electrical energy and an increased control of its borders came right after the accession of Slovenia to the European integrations and its membership in NATO.

Focus On

As an actor in the balance, small and developing countries can play a certain role in negotiations as a conditionally neutral country, when solving problems of interests, by playing the role of a host for the belligerents. By participating actively in solving the problems they can better their geo-political identity in the international community. Within this position between the belligerents (not having in mind only war conflicts) their decision on taking side with either one or the other coalition or union can sometimes tip the scales either on one side or the other.

The above circumstances in which small and developing countries can find themselves in a role of maintaining the balance of powers at the crossroads of different processes in the international community particularly declares the view from the point of security and determines: direct and indirect importance of a stable security environment at the local and regional level, guidelines for putting the security resources on one of the opposing parties, guidelines for accepting collective security and joint responsibility for the possible solutions by forming a joint strategy and the possibility to be attacked as a member of 'one of the belligerents' by a different spectrum of both armed and unarmed violence.

The importance from the point of defence can be seen through: providing capacities, infrastructure and geo-space for the purpose of the realisation of the activities from the domain of collective defence, as well as the engagement of human and material resources, the possibility of participation and preparations for missions of one of the parties in the crisis or reception of their troops⁴ and support in fighting the transitional threats

In essence, every small and developing country has its own geo-political and geo-strategic importance, which can at times have either positive or negative effect on that country. An increase in the importance of small and developing countries can be obtained through:

- acquiring full membership in associations, unions or coalitions at the regional or world level;
- gradual integration into the process of establishing security zones in the region in order to lower the possibility of crises breaking out;
- continuous establishment of bilateral and unilateral relations with the neighbours
- development of the defence capacities for the purpose of collective defence;
- improvement of relations with the most important actors at the world scene (USA, the Great Britain, Russia, China, France, Japan, Germany, etc).

By adopting this approach and accomplishing primarily small goals, and later on the strategic ones, we can gain: further strengthening of the sovereignty under the conditions of the process of globalisation, further building of favourable conditions for the development of national identity, securing a continuous upgrade of the state of national security, as well as creation of the optimal conditions for the economic and societal development.

From the point of economy, small and developing countries can primarily be important because they have cheap resources and work force. In case that some of them do not have any important strategic resources or a favourable geo-strategic position, that can be of critical importance for the access to the international market, adopting an organised approach to the

⁴ Host Nation Support represents a programme in NATO, which envisages support for countries that receive NATO forces on their territory. The programme has been envisaged for the permanent NATO members and the members of the 'Partnership for Peace' programme.

Focus On

development and signing bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as access to certain trade organisations at the regional and world level.

Geo-historical characteristics of the position of small and developing countries also influence the note of their current state and project their possible state in the future. One part of them were members of the Non-aligned Movement, like Burma, ex Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and others, while a part of them came into existence by disintegration of the Soviet Union, like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and others. The characteristics of these countries are that they are frequently at the borders of the former members of the Warsaw Pact Organisation and NATO, so by disintegration of one of the blocks they have started losing their importance as a buffer zone, but their importance has been increased in terms of the fact that the only remaining coalition in the world has accepted them and guided them through various programmes until they have reached full membership. It is obvious that this has widely opened the door for the ways of independent democratic development, integration processes with other countries, but it has also been fertile soil for crises development, especially through the influence of the capital from the highly developed countries, that have been able in this way to create economic and societal movements of the countries from this group. In this case small and developing countries have gained on importance from the perspective of the redistribution of influences and have been so lucky (or unlucky) to take side with their ex colonial powers. By combining this 'inferiority' with the internal and external factors, as well as with the events in a country that is in the process of transition, small and developing countries were important for the highly developed countries due to the following reasons: conquering of the market, that is to say the placement of the finished products into these countries, exploitation of the economic goods, privatisation of the ex economy giants and others. However, an openness towards the rest of the world and the benefits of development within a part of the international community mitigates extremely negative points of view, so even small and developing countries, by using their current importance and 'interest' of the highly developed countries, use in different ways their current aspirations and strive towards better future for the purpose of accomplishing their own interests as a driving engine at the scene of international relations.