

Transatlantic Relation and NATO

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While a huge amount of the world's Media took Trump's unusual electoral strategies as proof that he was not an appropriate choice for the White House, his contentious style and his confrontational declarations fueled belief in his supporters that he really was capable of breaking the status quo, and therefore able to offer real change to those left behind by Globalization. As result, strong and widespread are the expectations that the new Trump administration will have an almost revolutionary impact both on the United States and the international political system. In any case, just few days after his victory, president elect Trump dismissed the importance of prosecuting Hillary Clinton and softened his view on climate change and on an Obamacare of which he now seems keen to keep its strongest assets. On the other hand, he has been very careful in not to demise other strong points. President elect has maintained his position on abortion, and trade deals, and his closest advisers have reaffirmed that the building of a wall on the border with Mexico will move forward. Living up to his promises will involve spending considerable amount of time, money, and political capital. In addition, it will require cross-party support.

Regardless of the actual path that president Trump will undertake, his victory makes one thing certain: it will mark an abrupt halt to the expansion of open markets. The president elect Trump celebrated the outcome of the British referendum, although most of the European Union leaders equate this result to a –'catastrophe.' The pledges to impose unilateral tariffs on Chinese imports, renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement and block the Trans Pacific Partnership indicate that protectionism is central to his 'America first' policy. In the wake of Brexit, the United Kingdom is depending on strong trade deals with the rest of the world and to this end the new administration stance on free trade couldn't be more ill timed for the United Kingdom. In terms of foreign policy, it is very difficult to assess what will be the future of the European sanctions over the Russian Federation. However, the president elect gives the Russian Federation the opportunity to tone down the rabid anti-American war rhetoric and instead seek a more cooperative relationship. The regrettable irony is that all of this may make the world safer, but this is rather possible to happen at the expense of the European allies.

Some of the head of government of the Middle East see him as a strongman figure, somebody who will make deals with other strongmen like themselves. Some of the Gulf elites hope that he will be harder on Iran than president Obama. As a candidate to the White House, Trump called the deal struck by Obama on Iran's nuclear program a 'disaster' and 'the worst deal ever negotiated. Conversely, the revolutionary establishment in Tehran welcomes Trump's election. Turkey rejoiced cautiously at the unexpected victory. Whether this positive sentiment will persist once Trump officially assumes office and will begin to pursue his own way the destruction of the self defined Islamic State remains to be seen.

Electoral statements aside, strong is the feeling that the role of the United States as a superpower is now likely to decline more rapidly than thought likely a few months ago. This, in itself, could also prove positive for the future of the United States. The urgent need to heal domestic divisions and rebuild trust at home seems to force the United States to step back from the world stage.

While the Allies and the institutions that emerged after World War II will suffer, other countries, including the People Republic of China and the Russian Federation, will take advantage of this. In the last seventy years, the two pillars of the transatlantic community have been, on the one hand, a close relationship in the field of security and defense, on the other, active engagement in shaping the direction of European integration. These two pillars were torn apart by an unhappy and rebellious electorate, clear symptom of a malaise common to the political systems of both sides of the Atlantic.

Such a malaise is known in political science as 'deficit of representativeness,' in other words as a lack of confidence of the voters against their political representatives.

At the moment, the ideological ideas that seem to guide the new administration are basically three. The first is identifiable in a clear opposition to any alliance in peacetime, a position to tell the truth has deep roots in the history of the United States. The second is represented by a open opposition to free trade, something as well far from strange to the American political tradition. The third is constituted by a remarkable degree of tolerance towards authoritarianism. If in the coming years, the Trump administration will manage to implement a policy vision resting on these three approaches, the liberal order at the base of international relations that the United States have long helped to build and protect in all probability will at least downsize considerably. Meanwhile, the surprising phone call between the President elect Trump and the Taiwanese president in early December is a first visible consequence of the way in which the new president looks to the Asia Pacific.

The president-elect Trump wanted to prove two things with that phone call. The first one is that his administration will be methodologically far from the usual practice and conventions. The second one is that he will be ready to move very unscrupulously against the People Republic of China. At this point, it seems likely that, already in his first hundred days, the Trump administration could denounce the Peoples Republic of China as a currency manipulator, thus starting a series of dynamics that may ultimately result in the United States exit from the World Trade Organization. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities may be tempted to act in advance, and to dare some provocation in maritime expanses always quarrels with Vietnam.